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Executive summary 
 
What we see in Russia today is a dual media system, with independent and critical 
newspapers on one side vs. controlled and censored television channels on the other. The 
independent media are facing severe difficulties, and the accountability of the elected are 
nearly non-existing. The weaknesses of the judicial system allowing arbitrary exercising of 
the legislation against journalists, the increased control of media outlets both regional and 
federal, among television channels, newspapers and online media, lack of access to 
information, all are preventing the development of the media as the fourth estate providing a 
check on those in power. Journalistic practises, the heritage from the Soviet era and not at 
least the ownership structures are contributing to the development of a media system in 
favour of authoritarianism. Globalization has only a minor effect on freedom of speech due to 
increased control of the internet, and the capacities the authorities have shown to use 
globalization to their own advantage. The Russian media today are far more contributing to 
uphold an authoritarian regime than contributing to increased democracy. 
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 Table 1 Newspaper circulation figures in Russia, 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It is difficult to find exact circulation figures for Russia. The National Circulation Service (NCS) is 
responsible for monitoring and auditing press circulation, both only around half of the country‟s leading 
papers have signed up to the service. This table is based on three different sources: (BBC 2008; 
Krasnoboka 2010; Oates 2010). 
 
 
Table 2 Television audience in Russia (average daily share) 
 
Source: TNS Russia  
Average daily share of television - the average number of people who watched TV during the day, expressed 
as a percentage of total viewers (those who watched any TV during the day, including the estimated channel). 
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Argumenty i fakty 2.9 million 
Weekly Life 1.9 million 
TV Guide 1.2 million 
Perm' region Izvestia 1 million 
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Antenna 654, 000 
Metro-74 551, 000 
Novaya Gazeta 535, 000 
Russijskaya Gazeta 432, 000 
Our Newspaper for Television Programmes  415, 000 
Ads of the South 365, 000 
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 3 Introduction   
 
The topic to be addressed in this master‟s thesis is the role of the media in the 
authoritarian political system in Russia. The Russian authorities are keeping control over the 
main media and their coverage of major events in Russia today. One of the major differences 
between Russia today and the Soviet Union before Mikhail S. Gorbachev (b. 1931; General 
Secretary, 1985-1991) is access to information from the world outside Russia. With the 
increasing access to internet and TV channels as BBC, Russians can get access to other 
angles of news events. How does the Russian state continue to control media coverage, in a 
global environment?  This thesis will analyse the media system in Russia today, and its 
relation to the political system. What role do the media in Russia play today, after a 
decade with Vladimir Putin (b. 1952) either as President (2000-2008) or as Prime 
Minister (1999-2000 and since 2008)?  Has the increased access to the rest of the world 
had an impact on media coverage, and how do the authorities respond to the challenges 
which this access poses? 
Russia has undergone great changes the three last decades. The Soviet regime was an 
authoritarian system with the rule of one party, having considerable control over the lives of 
the citizens. Censorship was thorough and permeated all of society. Art, culture, music, 
foreign and domestic news were subject to censorship before being put before an audience 
(Newth). The media was the prolonged arm of the Communist Party, and information was 
seen as a privilege (de Smaele 2006; Simons and Strovsky 2006). 
The years under Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin (1931-2007; President of the Russian 
Federation, 1991-1999) have been labelled as the golden era for mass media in Russia 
(Belin 2002; Simons and Strovsky 2006; Jakubowicz and Sükösd 2008). Although the press 
was given far more freedom than under the Soviet era, the Kremlin was still defining what 
kind of information was useful. But in contrast to the omnipresent censorship in the Soviet 
Union, the limitations for the media became reduced when Mikhail Gorbachev permitted the 
broadcasting of debates among Party officials and when Boris Yeltsin granted some 
measure of freedom of the press. Under Gorbachev and Yeltsin, Russia developed pluralistic 
and more independent media. 
In the decade since Putin came to power, Russian society has undergone changes 
politically and economically, and the media are deeply affected by these changes. Among 
scholars studying Russia and Russian politics, many have considered whether Russia, after 
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a decade in the 1990‟s with media freedom, is moving towards a more authoritarian political 
system, controlling the media. The Russian media outlets today are under the control of the 
authorities, both regional and central. Some independent media radio stations, printed press 
and online media exist, but with few listeners/readers. 
When discussing the role of the Russian media, the historical development of the media 
will be discussed. I will look into the ownership structures of the different media outlets today 
and how the authorities control the media and what they control. The journalistic 
professionalism among Russian journalists will also be considered. The thesis will focus 
mainly on television news, newspapers and internet. The period will be from 2000 to 2010. I 
will also look into regional differences. 
 
3.1 Background 
 
Russian independent media outlets are confronted with several challenges in Russia 
today.  Among these challenges are denial of access to press conferences, the closing of 
websites, the barring of access to transmit their radio or television programs and the 
replacement of oppositional editors with loyal ones (Belin 2002; Simons and Strovsky 2006; 
Leeson and Coyne 2008). The independent journalist has yet another fear to encounter as, 
according to a recent Reporters Without Borders report, 22 journalists in Russia were killed 
in the period from 2000 – 2009 while performing their job, five of them in 2009 
(ReportersWithoutBorders 2010a).  
The war on terrorism has led to limitations for the media outlets in how and what they 
should report from the war. Censorship in the aftermath of acts of terrorism in Russia is 
extreme and critical.  The regime implemented a takeover of the ownership of the most 
important TV channels, discharged editors, and issued guidelines on how and what to report 
on acts of terror. Bills have been proposed that further limit the media outlets news 
communication. Together with the frightening environment the independent journalists are 
forced to work under, freedom of expression is under hard pressure in Russia today.  
 
Russian authorities argue that the state is the best provider of information to Russians, 
and that they protect the interests of the citizens when preventing the mass media from 
reporting freely. The Russian authorities claim that they act in the best interests of society, to 
protect their citizens. The developments in Russia since Putin came to power have caused 
political scientists from both western countries and post-communist countries to warn about 
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authoritarian trends in Russia.  
 
3.2 Statement of the problem 
 
The aim of this thesis is to look at the role of the media in an authoritarian system. 
What role do the media in Russia play today, after a decade with Vladimir Putin (b. 
1952) either as President (2000-2008) or as Prime Minister (1999-2000 and since 2008)?   
The media, and in particular the television channels, have become the main source of 
political debates and discourse. The political elite‟s principal concern is the importance of 
media and the impact media have on their electorate. Thus, the regime‟s media policies are 
designed to serve the interests of the regime itself. Government regulations are different in 
different countries, where the greatest discrepancies in the role of the media are between 
democratic and nondemocratic political systems (Mughan and Gunther 2000). Media 
freedom and freedom of speech are widely discussed themes in established democracies. 
What limitations of freedom of speech, if any, should be present in a media system in a 
democracy? John Stuart Mill did elaborate on this question in his On Liberty (1868) 
discussing what reasons a nation could have for putting restrictions on freedom of 
expression.  Such questions emerge now and again in many countries. How far should 
freedom of expression reach in religion, pornography or a nation‟s security? The debate in 
Norway has repeatedly been related to freedom of expression in religion. A Christian 
magazine printed cartoons of Mohammed on two occasions, once in 2009 and again in 
September 2010, leading to threats from Muslims directed at the chief editor of the 
magazine. When two Russian regional newspapers, Gorodskie Vesti in Volgograd and Nash 
Region in Vologda were in 2007 closed down after publishing cartoons of Mohammed, that 
did not provoke any public discussions (Azhgikhina 2007: 1258; Khrestin and Elliot 2007).  
Another discussion ongoing both in Scandinavia and in the USA is how much information 
about the nation‟s military action should be public information. And when does free 
expression of one‟s opinion turn into something else, such as libel or slander?  In the USA, 
advertising during election campaigns may be viewed as slander, as the advertising goes far 
in the direction of attack ads which frequently include disinformation. 
WikiLeaks has lately played an important role.  It has published anonymous submissions 
and leaks of otherwise unavailable documents while preserving the anonymity of sources. 
The publication of 250,000 US Embassy Diplomatic Cables in November 2010 has led 
American commercial web-sites to expel WikiLeaks from their Web site hosting services. In 
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addition, Pay Pal, American Express and Visa have blocked the possibility to donate money 
to WikiLeaks through their services. According to PayPal‟s Vice President, the United States 
Department of State had informed his company that WikiLeaks was involved in illegal 
activities. Tom Flanagan, senior advisor to the Canada‟s Prime Minister Stephen Harper, 
said WikiLeaks leader Julian Assange should “be assassinated actually” (Siddique and 
Weaver 2010).  Has WikiLeaks pushed the media to write more openly and directly?  Or are 
we seeing censorship unfolding in the Western countries as well? What, if any, are the 
influences of WikiLeaks in Russia? 
Russia has undergone many changes during the last three decades, and the earlier 
optimism among political scientists that Russian society was in transition toward democracy 
has been attenuated (de Smaele 2006; Simons and Strovsky 2006; Oates 2007). The 
changes in society and the changes in system of government are evidently reflected in 
changes in the media and media politics. Today, there are hardly any discussions regarding 
freedom of speech in the public sphere, with the exception of instances when a Russian 
journalist is killed. The Russian media encounter challenges to freedom of expression as 
they face serious issues in terms of openness and control (Oates 2006: 6).  
The objective of this study is to analyze the media system in Russia today. I will discuss 
what role the media have in Russia today, both for the politicians and for the citizens. The 
role of the media will be viewed in relation to the Russian political system, and the global 
environment. 
With access to internet and to foreign television channels, the Russians are increasingly 
capable of getting other views and different news coverage than what is offered by the 
Russian main media. How do the Russian media encounter these challenges, and how does 
the government respond to this different news coverage from abroad?
16
 4 Democracy theory  
 
The word democracy has a positive resonance nearly all over the world. Politicians want 
to be viewed as democratic, and people struggling for a freer life and better conditions want 
to be ruled by democratic rulers. The concept democracy is so widely embraced by different 
regimes giving their own understanding of the word, that there is a danger that the term will 
lose any clear meaning (Schmitter and Karl 1991; de Smaele 2006).   
Closely linked to democracy is freedom of expression. The free press operates as check on 
politics and as a link between the citizens and their political representatives; it is an 
instrument for holding government accountable, and for citizens to get informed, 
communicate their wishes and participate in  political decision-making (de Smaele 2006:42) 
To begin with, theories about democracy and freedom of expression will be outlined. 
The idea is to indicate how democracy and freedom of expression are linked together. An 
examination of the discourse on democracy in Russia will also be outlined here. Hallin and 
Mancini‟s variables for analysing the media system will be presented, as this is the method 
used for analysis in this thesis. 
 
Democracy theories are well established in political science, and have a central focus in 
the research field. These theories discuss how democracy is a process of selecting 
governments, and what the necessary conditions for a democracy are.  
Democracy is the rule of the majority (Bobbio and Bellamy 1987). It is a political system 
rested on free, competitive and regular elections.  
In the research field today, scholars discuss whether democracy can be applied to all 
parts of the world no matter what culture, or if there are any cultural preconditions that must 
be present in society before a country can become a democracy. The idea that some 
cultures adapt better to democracy as a political system than others is not new. But there has 
been renewed interest in this idea as primarily the USA, with support from other western 
democracies and the UN, has been promoting democracy in new areas of the world, as seen 
in Iraq and Afghanistan (Zakaria 1997).  
The defence of liberties, or constitutional liberties, such as speech, assembly, religion 
and property is connected to democracy. But, as Zakaria argues, these liberties are not a 
necessary part of democracy. A country can hold free and fair elections and restrain 
constitutional liberties, and still be a democracy, though not a liberal democracy. He states 
that even though democracies can be found in more parts of the world than earlier, many of 
these democracies are violating liberties such as freedom of speech, religion and other 
political and civil liberties (Zakaria 1997: 22). If those who are elected perform their duties 
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badly, by being corrupt, unfair, or reducing the citizens‟ civil rights, such “governments are 
undesirable but that does not make them undemocratic” (Huntington 1991: 10). Such 
democracies, where the leaders are elected through free and fair elections, but who erode or 
diminish these liberties after they are elected, may be called “illiberal democracies” (Zakaria 
1997: 23). In his Gettysburg address, American President Abraham Lincoln defined 
democracy as “government of the people, by the people, and for the people” (Lincoln 19 
November 1863). A government not ruling for the people and by the people may turn into a 
pro forma democracy, ruling against the people. If new democracies fail to perform as 
expected by the citizens, without developing democratic set of rules as defence of civil 
liberties and political competition, they might revert to earlier authoritarian practices or even 
constitute new such regimes (Schmitter 1994). This thesis focuses on freedom of expression 
in Russia, and hence, also on the performance of democracy in that country. 
To continue with the aforementioned meaning of democracy, researchers of democracy 
have developed new terms to define the regimes where the rulers have introduced elections, 
and elections only, which do not create a democracy. Scholars have defined such hybrid 
regimes, as competitive authoritarianism, electoral authoritarianism and delegative 
democracy to mention some. 
A term introduced by Schmitter and O‟Donnell to refer to formally democratic systems 
which are deficient in practice is democradura. This term refers to regimes which hold 
elections, but under such conditions that the government is ensured re-election.  
Democraduras are not democratic, but can serve as a smoke screen for continued 
authoritarian regimes (Schmitter 1994; O'Donnell 2002).  
 
One notion indivisibly connected with democracy and included in the actual definition of 
democracy is accountability. In the article “What Democracy is...and is not”, Schmitter and 
Karl (1991) provide this definition: 
“Modern political democracy is a system of governance in which rulers are held 
accountable for their actions in the public realm by citizens, acting indirectly through the 
competition and cooperation of their elected representatives” (Schmitter and Karl 1991: 
76).  
I will focus on what is under discussion here, namely how to link accountability to freedom of 
speech. We can understand political accountability, according to Andreas Schelder 
(Schedler, Diamond et al. 1999), as how a society copes with actual and potential abuses of 
power. Hereunder is the aspect answerability. Answerability assumes the presence of 
freedom of speech, as answerability is understood to mean that those held accountable must 
inform those to whom they are accountable of their decisions and provide explanations of 
those decisions. The most obvious means to do so are the media. The civil society actors, as 
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the mass media, try to hold state agents accountable for their actions. The existence of press 
freedom is necessary for holding government accountable (Schedler, Diamond et al. 1999) . 
The role of media in democracy theory will be further discussed in chapter 4.1. 
 
 
4.1 Democracy Theory and freedom of expression 
 
Theories on democracy have underlined the importance of media‟s role in a democracy. 
Huntington defines democracy as a political system based on free, competitive and regular 
elections. Without a free press there will be no competitive elections. Democracy presumes 
the freedom to speak and publish whatever is necessary for political debate and an informed 
public. A system is undemocratic to the extent that media outlets are censored or closed 
down (Huntington 1991: 7).  
Linz and Stepan (1996) differentiate between consolidated and transitional democracies. 
To obtain a consolidated democracy, autonomous and independent civil and political society 
must be supported by the rule of law. To ensure these conditions in a society, civil society 
must be relatively autonomous from the state and be able to advance its interests.  Civil 
society is also capable of removing the government through free and competitive elections, if 
its actions are unacceptable to the majority. The media are ideally the means for the citizens 
to exercise such control of the politicians‟ actions.  (Linz and Stepan 1996; Mughan and 
Gunther 2000).  
Robert Dahl has sorted out the required political institutions in a modern representative 
democracy (2005). These are  
i) Elected officials 
ii) Free, fair and frequent elections 
iii) Freedom of expression 
iv) Alternative sources of information 
v) Associational autonomy 
vi) Inclusive citizenship 
In order for citizens to participate, they must have the opportunity to share their views and 
opinions freely. Dahl eloquently describes this in an article published in 2005, where he 
writes:  “Free expression means not just that you have the right to be heard. It also means 
that people have the right to hear what others have to say” (2005:196). And whereas Linz 
and Stepan discuss civil society using the media as a means to control the politicians, Dahl 
has discussed how the citizens of the country, need to achieve civic competence by 
exchanging opinions and views, being involved in discussions, and listening to and talking to 
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experts and politicians. In the absence of institutionalized freedom of expression, civil society 
loses its potential to influence “the agenda of governmental decisions” (Linz and Stepan 
1996; Dahl 2005:196).  
“Enlightened understanding” through access to diverse sources of information, provided by 
agents other than the government, is defined by Dahl as “alternative sources of information” 
(iv). When all information granted or available to the citizens of a country is generated by the 
government or one main political group, those same citizens will be prevented from playing 
an effective role in society. 
When discussing the media‟s role in a democracy, the concept of accountability both 
directly and indirectly accounts for media as a necessary actor to execute accountability.  
Here it is interesting to bring in the concept of the mass media as the fourth estate, a concept 
western media outlets willingly embellish. The idea is that the mass media have the function 
of watch dog for the ruling elites, and as such the media outlets may protect the society from 
“excessive state power”. The principle of the fourth estate is that the press as critical to those 
in power, are ensuring and protecting democratic principles. Although the principle of the 
fourth estate are not always realised, the press‟s self-conception as the fourth estate is 
essential to the belief system governing journalism as a field of practice (Jensen 2010: 617 - 
618). The mass media are the organs through which, in theory, the citizens communicate 
with the politicians they have elected, although, in reality, what is published in the mass 
media depends ultimately on who owns the media and what the media owners are prepared 
to see published in their media. The information and influence goes both ways through the 
use of mass media as means (Mughan and Gunther 2000). And as we have seen, in 
democratic theory, one of many variables necessary for a liberal democracy is media 
freedom. Established, free media institutions are essential to maintain a democracy. The 
media are the channels between the citizens and the politicians, and give the electorate an 
opportunity to control the elected, while the politicians use the media as a channel for giving 
the citizenry information, for discussion and for influence. This ideal, at least in western 
countries, casts the mass media as the fourth estate, where the mass media act as a check 
on the governing powers. The media are protected from government power, and media 
pluralism is institutionalized. Linz describes the connection between the authoritarian 
regimes and the media that the government are controlling the mass media, through strict 
censorship, repression of journalistic liberty, and control of the information conveyed to the 
public (Mughan and Gunther 2000).  
This gives a normative description of the free media in democracies, acting as the fourth 
estate, versus the supervised media in authoritarian regimes. The normative aspect is 
interesting, and is often reflected in discussions of freedom of speech. In order to analyse a 
media system and its role in any political system, one needs to focus on what the functions of 
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the media are. Does the political system, in which the mass media are acting, promote 
accountability or does the political system prevent accountability and provide a framework 
within which the authorities use the media to control the information given to the public? Here 
a theoretical framework referring to the important aspects on how the media are behaving in 
relation to the political system is needed. An empirical study of why the media developed as 
they did, and what affects their relationship with the political system is provided by Hallin and 
Mancini (2004). Before presenting the method of Hallin and Mancini, the dual concept of 
democracy and media freedom as practised in Russia will be examined. 
 
4.2 Democracy, freedom of expression and Russia 
 
There are many labels put on the political system in Russia after the fall of communism. 
The heritage as one of 15 successor states after the dissolution of Soviet Union is 
considerable, and will be further discussed below. de Smaele (2010) has noted the various 
labels employed to describe Russia--  delegated democracy, authoritarian democracy, 
military democracy, and totalitarian -- all of which indicate an incomplete process of 
democratization. These labels refer to the division between the actual development of 
democratic institutions and the democratic rhetoric used by the authorities.  
Both Remington (2010) and Becker (2004) have called attention to several authoritarian 
trends in Russia after Putin came to power, and among these trends is the control of the 
media. Becker argues that an authoritarian regime is recognized among other things by its 
will to limit access to information on the part of the public. When a state power uses means 
to restrict the public‟s access to information and how this information is presented, the 
possibility of authoritarianism is present (Becker 2004).  Russia today is generally regarded 
by western scholars today as an authoritarian regime, and many have asserted that, led by 
Vladimir Putin, currently serving as prime minister, Russia is moving toward a more 
authoritarian, Soviet style media system, if it is not already there (Oates 2007; McFaul and 
Stoner-Weiss 2008; de Smaele 2010; Lipman 2010; Remington 2010). A different analysis is 
provided by Richard Sakwa in his book Putin:  Russia‟s choice (2008):  Here Sakwa writes 
that “[Putin might] not be democracy‟s greatest friend, yet [he might be] providing the 
conditions in which democracy and the market could thrive” (Sakwa 2008: 315). Ivan 
Zassoursky, in his chapter “Free to get rich and fool around” (2009: 41) compares the media 
system in Russia today, with the media under Leonid I. Brezhnev (1906-1982; General 
Secretary, 1964-1982). But Zassoursky indicates that the age of internet might lead to a 
more accountable and transparent political system, and cause a change in the system of 
administration. 
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John Stuart Mill, as a liberal democratic theorist, sees democracy as unthinkable without 
freedom of the press. This led him to the conclusion that media freedom is a necessary 
precondition of democracy, as well as the other way around (Mill 1868; Jakubowicz and 
Sükösd 2008). Oates (2007) asserts that the media in Russia today have developed into an 
institution that strengthens the governing elites, ensuring their reelection. This results in a 
lack of accountability as mentioned above. The citizens cannot use the media to control the 
governing elite, and the media‟s function as a channel between those who govern and those 
who are governed goes only from the authorities to the citizens.  
The label democradura as presented earlier, as a system where the governing elites 
prevent the emergence of real competition to ensure that they are re-elected, may be 
appropriate when discussing the Russian political system. The political democratic 
institutions are present in Russia, but only in form; these include elections, parliament and 
media outlets, but they lack democratic content (Oates 2007) . The elections are not free and 
fair, and the competition is missing. This thesis will analyze the media system that supports 
the power of the elites, and the lack of accountability. The environment for the independent 
media and the independent journalist in Russia today will be considered. The thesis will look 
at the historical context and what effect it has had on the media system, and inquire as to 
whether the circumstances today are working in favor of giving democratic content to the 
media outlets. Who controls the media both in regards to ownership and power of influence 
will be analyzed. Scientists from the East European countries have discussed the historical 
context of the post-Soviet states and have also focused on how the Russian journalists and 
the Russian media are affected by the omnipresent censorship experienced in the Soviet 
era. Zassoursky (2004), Jakubowicz and Sükösd (2008), Koltsova (2001), and Pasti (2005) 
are important contributors to this discussion.  
 
4.3 Theoretical framework 
4.3.1 Introduction 
 
When studying the role of the media in the political system, a theoretical framework with 
a focus on the media system and its function is needed. The method I chose to use is 
borrowed from the field of communication studies. In their book Comparing Media Systems 
(2004), Hallin and Mancini have presented a theoretical framework for the comparative 
analysis of media systems. Hallin and Mancini are both professors in political science, but 
their comparative analysis was done in the field of communication studies. This framework is 
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chosen because they focus on the relation between the media systems and political systems, 
which is the focus of this thesis. The central question in their book is “Why are the media as 
they are” (Hallin and Mancini 2004:2). The focus in my thesis will be Why are the Russian 
media as they are.  
I found Hallin and Mancini‟s method useful for studying the media‟s role in Russia today 
because they have focused on which variables it is necessary to investigate when discussing 
a media system. They argue that “one cannot understand the news media without 
understanding the nature of the state, the system of political parties, the pattern of relations 
between economic and political interests, and the development of civil society” (Hallin and 
Mancini 2004:8). In analysing these features in Russia, this thesis will, in all modesty, try to 
explain why the Russian media are as they are. 
 
4.3.2 The dimensions in the media system 
 
According to Hallin and Mancini, four variables or dimensions are essential when 
analysing a media system and its relation to the political system: 
1) The development of the media market 
This dimension focuses on the historical development of the media. The level of a 
newspaper‟s circulation is suggestive of the time when the development of a mass circulation 
press occurred. Another important aspect is to what kind of audience the mass newspapers 
were addressed and for whom the first newspapers were intended, the elites or the mass 
public. The dimension also looks at the debate in the newspapers, whether it was horizontal, 
between different elite factions or vertical, between political elites and ordinary citizens.  
Literacy rates are connected to the development of mass circulation press, the number of 
newspaper circulations are dependent on the ability to read. Hallin and Mancini (2004) argue 
that those countries which did not develop a mass circulation press in the late nineteenth 
century, never did so subsequently even though literacy rates and political and economical 
development have developed to the same level as high-circulation countries. “The presence 
or absence of the mass circulation press has deep implications for the development of the 
media as political institutions” (Hallin and Mancini 2004:24). This dimension is particularly 
interesting when discussing the Russian media system as the development of a mass 
circulation press developed under conditions quite different from those prevailing in the 
western countries Hallin and Mancini discuss.  
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2) Political parallelism 
This dimension puts a focus on the connection between the media and the political 
parties, between the journalist and politician, the development of a party press and the 
commercial press. In Soviet Union, the development of the party press was the only 
alternative; all newspapers, radio and television channels were owned and run by the 
Communist Party. But what is the political parallelism in Russia today among the media 
outlets, and what are the differences between the printed media outlets and the television 
channels? Where are the connections apparent? 
Hallin and Mancini refer to some indicators for identifying political parallelism: 
i. Media content – how the news coverage indicates the political orientations of 
the media outlet.  
ii. Organizational connections – between media and political parties, trade 
unions, cooperatives, churches and others 
iii. The tendency for media personnel to be active in political life 
iv. The tendency in some systems for the career paths of journalists and other 
media personnel to be shaped by their political affiliations 
v. Partisanship on the part of media audiences 
vi. Journalistic role orientations and practices. 
How the Russian media system “scores” on these variables, will be reflected in how 
strong political parallelism is present in the system. If the political parallelism is strong, this 
will be reflected in how the culture and main discussions of journalism is related to the culture 
and discussions of politics (Hallin and Mancini 2004: 29) 
One may also draw a distinction between external and internal pluralism. External 
pluralism is defined by Hallin and Mancini (2004) as the pluralism obtained when there are 
several media outlets or organizations that include different points of views reflecting 
contrasting groups or even tendencies in society. Such systems will be characterized by a 
high level of political pluralism. This is in contrast to internal pluralism, when pluralism is 
obtained within each individual media outlet or organization. The latter is referred to as media 
systems where the outlets avoid institutional ties to political groups and want to keep 
neutrality in their content. These features are seen in systems with low political parallelism. 
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3) The development of journalistic professionalism 
Unlike many other professions such as medicine or law, journalism has no systematic 
body of knowledge or doctrine. Formal professional training has become more usual in 
journalism, and this is important for defining journalism as an occupation. Although it has 
become more usual also for journalists in Western Europe to complete some form of 
education, it is not formalized. You can become a journalist in Europe without holding a 
journalism degree. Hallin and Mancini are referring to other criteria of importance for 
journalistic professionalism, as autonomy, in the sense that the journalists control their own 
work process and have freedom of pressure from the management. Other aspects of 
journalistic professionalism as responsibility, accountability and freedom will also be taken 
into account in this thesis. The norms may deal with how to protect sources, or keeping 
distance between editorial material and advertised material (Hallin and Mancini 2004). The 
development of the professional journalist in Russia are special in the sense that historically 
Soviet journalists were trained by the Communist Party, and were expected to achieve 
objectives which were quite different from those expected of journalists in the West.  I shall 
return to this later.  
 
4) The degree and nature of state intervention in the media system  
The state shapes the media systems in every society, using different means to different 
extents. Public service broadcasting in Russia is state-owned and therefore under some sort 
of control of the state. Other forms of control as press subsidies, the right to protect sources, 
laws regulating the media concentrations, media ownership and the media‟s access to 
government information are important. The latter is especially interesting as the state is the 
provider of information and “primary definer” of news (Hallin and Mancini 2004:44). The 
degree of control from the state, and whom the state wants to control are aspects of the 
Russian media which need to be explored. 
Hallin and Mancini developed and used their method when comparing Western media 
systems, but they suggested that it could be developed to be used also for other media 
systems. Making use of the methodology developed by Hallin and Mancini, Jakubowicz and 
Sükösd looked at the media systems in the Soviet successor states, discussing 12 concepts 
regarding media system evolution. Their analysis is important for understanding the 
circumstances in which the Russian media were developing after the collapse of communism 
(Jakubowicz and Sükösd 2008: 27). 
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In addition to Hallin and Mancini‟s variables, globalization and the effect this has had on 
the media system will be of importance for this thesis. Curran and Park discuss in their book 
De-westernizing media studies (2000) how globalization has affected the media systems also 
in the post-communist countries, and argue that this must be taken into consideration when 
discussing media systems and their relationship to political systems. Globalization theory is 
important for explaining certain traits of the Russian media system, and also the direction in 
which the media have evolved. 
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 5 The media outlets and ownership structures 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Before analysing these variables according to the Russian media system, I will present 
an overview of the main television channels, the most important radio station and the printed 
media, together with the daily reach of the most popular television channels and radio 
stations. This chapter will also try to give an overall picture of the media ownership structures 
in Russia, in particular for television channels. The media ownership in Russia is quite 
diverse, but “no central media outlet can challenge the Kremlin‟s monopoly on power and 
information. In this way, the Russian media have in a broad sense come full circle back to 
the media environment of the Soviet period” (Oates 2006: 29). Ownership concentration is 
likely to have an influence on the media outlets.  Influence may be manifested insofar as the 
content may reflect the political or personal values of the media owners, or may be a function 
of catering to high-paying advertisers (Woods 2007). In this chapter the ownership structures 
will be introduced. It is particularly important to analyse media ownership, as a media 
concentration may affect freedom of speech. It is necessary to identify such media 
concentration because it can have implications for media independence. “By answering who 
owns the media we also answer the question of who holds the reins of power” (Hrvatin, Kučić 
et al. 2004). In an analysis conducted in 2003, Djankov and his associates found how 
government ownership had a negative effect on corruption. Corruption is higher in countries 
with concentrated media ownership. Corruption as part of the media system will also be 
addressed here.  
In a survey conducted in Russia in 2004, 82 percent responded that they watched 
television on a regularly basis, whereas 13 percent were watching only occasionally. The 
local channels were somewhat less popular than the national channels. When comparing 
with the newspapers, the local newspapers were more popular than the national ones. When 
asked what media outlets they watched for news about politics every day, 62 percent of the 
respondents said this came from television, 28 percent said radio and only 14 percent said 
newspapers (Oates 2006: 33). Let us take a closer look at the television channels and their 
influence of the Russian citizens, and try to define what factors influence the content of the 
television channels. 
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5.2 Television channels 
 
Television is the main source of information for Russians. 90 percent of all Russians 
have television, and the most popular news programs are Vremya on Channel One and Vesti 
on RTR.  (See Table 2 for average daily share of Television audience.) Television is 
considered the “only way to reach and sway the majority of the population” (Zassoursky 
2009: 31).  Almost every household in Russia has a television set with access to Channel 
One and RTR, but fewer have access to the other national channels. Russia is a vast 
country, and the satellite and cable infrastructure are not fully developed everywhere. The 
lack of such infrastructure means that most citizens have access only to these two channels. 
Where the household is situated geographically decides which channels the households can 
access, not economic obstacles, as the costs for subscription are close to none (Oates 2006: 
32) .  
Fifty-one per cent of the main nationwide television network, Channel One, is owned by 
the state with the rest is in the hands of state enterprises (Oates (2007: 30). Some claim that 
the rest of the ownership is in the hands of Roman Abramovich, a well known Russian 
businessman with connections to the power elites in Russia (Kiriya and Degtereva 2010). 
The state-owned enterprise Gazprom, Russia‟s biggest energy company owns the channels 
NTV and TNT. Ren-TV and Channel 5 are owned by National Media Group (NMG), which 
again is owned by Bank Rossia and the insurance company Sogas. The main share holders 
of these companies are the brothers Kovalchucks, said to have close connections to Putin. 
Channel Rossia, Channel Kul‟tura and Channel Vesti-24 are directly belonged by the state 
(Telegraph 2004; Kiriya and Degtereva 2010). Some other channels exist, as entertainment 
channels, where the state is not the owner, but the ownership lies in the hands of the 
Russian economical and political elite.  The ownership of the television channels are 
important to establish. As already mentioned, television has considerable influence in 
Russian society, and with the state as owner of most television channels, the Russian state 
has a threefold role. It is the owner, it regulates the market, and is the main provider of 
information to the news (Kiriya and Degtereva 2010).  
In 1999, VGTRK, a new media holding company, was established, with the TV channels 
Rossia, and radio stations Mayak and Radio Rossii, Channel Kul‟tura  in its umbrella, 
together with 89 regional TV stations.1 The transition of the regional TV channels to the 
                                               
1
 89 is also the number of administrative units in Russian Federation. 
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VGTRK came at the same time as the Kremlin cancelled the elections of regional governors 
and expanded its control of the regional administrations. In 2002, these TV stations lost their 
financial independence to VGTRK (Kiriya and Degtereva 2010). 
The TV channel Russia Today is also under the VGTRK umbrella.  This TV channel was 
initiated to contribute to improving Russia‟s image abroad. Russia Today is broadcasted in 
over 100 countries, and the channels has an own branch in USA, called Russia Today 
Americas, or RT Americas as it prefers to be called (Kiriya and Degtereva 2010; 
TheIndependent 2010; RussiaToday 2010b). As Table 3 shows, control of the TV channels 
can be described in three different types: 
i) Direct control of ownership by the state 
ii) Non-direct control via a state company (as Gazprom) 
iii) Non direct control based on unofficial relationship between the owner of the 
TV channel and the authorities (Kiriya and Degtereva 2010) .  
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Table 3 Overview of ownership in Russian TV channels and networks  
Channel Owner Type of control Affiliation Average daily 
share
2
 
Channel 1 
State 51%, private 
owners 49% 
Mixed: i), iii) 
Direct state ownership, non 
official affiliation with 
Abramovich 
18,3 
Rossia 
State media holding 
VGTRK 
i) Direct state control 18,5 
Culture 
State media holding 
VGTRK 
i) Direct state control 1,8 
Vesti-24 
State media holding 
VGTRK 
i) Direct state control 0,8 
Sport 
State media holding 
VGTRK 
i) Direct state control 2,2 
NTV Gasprom Media Group ii) Statemonopoly Gazprom 13,3 
TNT Gasprom Media Group ii) Statemonoploy Gazprom 6,9 
Ren-TV National Media Group iii) 
Bank Rossia, insurance 
company Sogas, Severstal 
Group, Surgusneftegas 
4,6 
Channel 5 National Media Group iii) 
Bank Rossia, insurance 
company Sogas 
2,0 
STS STS Media Group iii) Alfa Group MTG, Sweden 9,2 
Domashniy STS Media Group iii) Alfa Group MTG, Sweden 2,0 
DTV STS Media Group iii) Alfa Group MTG, Sweden 1,9 
MTV Prof-Media iii) 
Interross financial industry 
group 
1,0 
2x2 Prof-Media iii) 
Interross financial industry 
group 
0,5 
TV3 Prof-Media iii) 
Interross financial industry 
group 
2,7 
TV Center Moscow Government i) Moscow government 3,4 
Source: Kiriya and Degtereva  (2010) 
In addition to these channels, a new Muslim national TV has been launched by the 
government, “in the hope that it will foster tolerance”. The satellite channel will be available 
from February or March this year according to The Moscow Times (2011). An Orthodox 
                                               
2
 Average daily share (%) from 05.00 to 05.00 AM, week 2009.03.16 – 2009.03.22 (by TNS Gallup 
Media)  
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religious TV channel already exists, called Spas (“Savior”), launched in 2005 and supported 
by a group of anonymous philanthropists under the umbrella of the Russian Consulting 
Group. The editor of the channel was Ivan Demidov, who in 2008 was appointed head of the 
Ideological Directorate of the Political Department of United Russia‟s Central Executive and 
now holds the position as the Presidential Administration‟s point man for supersizing 
relations with religious organizations (RiaNovosti 2005; Umland 2008; Goble 2010).   
The state is the main owner of the major TV channels and as such the largest actor also 
in the TV market. This thesis will look at how this ownership influences state control of news 
coverage at the main TV channels, as Channel One, Rossia and NTV. The content of the 
non-state versus the state channels are very similar, as Kiriya and Degtereva (2010:44) 
described it, “the TV content ...[]is homogenous and entertainment-oriented.”  A closer look 
at the content will be provided in chapter 6.3. Before discussing the situation for the radio 
stations, the print media, and the internet, I will take a further look at an important feature of 
the Russian society, namely corruption. 
 
5.2.1 Corruption and Zakazhuka 
 
The practice of politicians or parties paying journalists in order to get positive news 
coverage for their own behalf, or ensure that the media are giving the opposition negative 
coverage, is a common phenomenon during election campaigns. Corruption is probably the 
greatest challenge in Russia today. Corruption is widespread and present at all levels of 
society. The phenomenon of corruption in journalism is present in diverse forms, from paid 
articles about the new local store to paid investigative journalism (Zassoursky 2004: 93; 
Pörzgen and Sager 2009: 7 - 8). This kind of corruption, to buy for news coverage, is called 
zakazhuka. The word is referring to acceptance of bribes by journalists in exchange for 
editorial content (Peters 2003: 53). Zakazhuka is in the literature also referred to as Black 
PR, defined as illegal methods, by which media outlets or journalists accept bribes in 
exchange for publication of materials, which are specifically intended to sway public opinion 
in favor of or against a certain candidate (Ledeneva 2006: 33). According to Ledeneva, a 
lawyer engaged in a regional electoral campaign reported that before an election campaign, 
the campaign leaders made a list of loyal journalist they could make use of in their campaign. 
At the federal level, PR companies are contracted by the politicians in order to give news 
coverage according to the political party or the politicians‟ wishes. “[...] it could cost §500 - 
§10,000 for an article to appear during the run-up to an election, depending on the article 
size, source and the name or the position of the journalists [...]. Custom-made articles could 
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cost as much as § 30 - § 50.000, whereas a TV release to the same effect would take the 
price up to the §20.000 - §100.000” (Ledeneva 2006: 34) . Black PR, or zakazhuka, is 
usually associated with payment for presenting negative information about a political 
opponent, in order to influence the electorate, but also to avoid negative coverage of a party 
or politician. The service of avoiding negative information is regarded as the most “expensive 
service” (Ledeneva 2006: 219) 
Editor of the newspaper Vyatsky Nablyudatel in Kirov region, Sergei Bachinin mentions 
“[...] the payment non-governmental media of Kirov Province [got] during the election 
campaign for the State Duma [in 2007]. A number of individuals offered all these 
media, without exception, substantial „charitable aid‟, ranging from tens to tens of 
thousands of dollars in return for their keeping quiet. They were required for these 
months to say nothing negative about United Russia or its candidates or about the 
doings of the province„s administration, whose governors happens also to be in 
charge of United Russia‟s election campaign” (Bachinin 2008: 133). 
Corruption in the Russian media is a common practice, and gives the parties and the 
politicians with money better opportunities to influence the media, either through PR 
companies or through their election campaigns. In addition, the authorities use bribes in 
order to get favourable coverage which results in paid articles. It is a paradox however, that 
the practice of Black PR is serving “competition as well as the needs of the political regime in 
terms of the manageability of democracy. [Corruption and black PR] are beneficial for certain 
groups of political technologists but also cater to the weakness of political parties. Such 
practice can be viewed as “weapon of the weak” in the context of competition with an 
incumbent who has access to the administrative resource. At the same time, the impact of 
[...] black PR in combination with the administrative resource can be enormous”  (Ledeneva 
2006: 53) A further look at how the authorities, and the party in power, are ensuring news 
coverage to their support will be provided in chapter 6.3.2. And chapter 6.4.2 will discuss 
further the implements of negative campaigning for journalistic professionalism.     
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5.3 Radio  
 
In this vast country, Russian citizens have approximately 1,250 local and regional radio 
stations in addition to nationwide stations to listen to. The majority of the radio stations are 
state-owned. Most radio stations do not produce alternative news, but are mainly music 
channels, which are quite popular in Russia. The most important radio stations with news are 
Radio Mayak, Radio Russki and the independent Ekho Moskvy. The latter is an independent 
radio station producing alternative news coverage (Beumers, Hutchings et al. 2009; 
Krasnoboka 2010). Radio Mayak and Radio of Russia are both under the umbrella of the 
state-owned VGTRK as mentioned above. Those stations provide their listeners with news, 
language programs and cultural events to mention some (Beumers, Hutchings et al. 2009).  
 
 Table 4 Daily reach for the radio stations in Russia, the period April – June 2010  
Radio Stations Daily reach 
% 
All Radio  65,2 
Europa Plus   18,2 
Russian Radio  17,4 
Autoradio  16,9 
Radio Chanson  14,9 
Retro FM  13,4 
Traffic Radio 13,4 
Radio Russia 9,2 
Humor FM  8,4 
Lighthouse  8,2 
Love Radio 6,8 
DFM  5,8 
Militia wave   5,3 
Hit FM  5,2 
Our Radio  4,4 
Radio 7 4,3 
Radio Dacha  4,2 
Ekho Moskvy  4,2 
Source: TNS Galup (2010) 
 
 Table 4 shows the 18 radio stations that had most listeners in the period from April – 
June 2010 throughout Russia (TNSGalup 2010). Here the most popular stations are listed to 
include also Ekho Moskvy. The numbers for Moscow in the same period put Ekho Moskvy at 
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11th on the list and the similar numbers for St. Petersburg will put Ekho Moskvy at 12th on the 
list, indicating that the station is more popular in the big cities.  
Radio has become more popular during the last decade, but the preferences have 
shifted from news radio stations as Radio Rossi, Mayak and Echo Moskvy to musical 
stations to Autoradio, Europa Plus and Russkoe Radio. Such decline in interest in news and 
in the state of affairs in Russia can be seen as a lack of interest of the political affairs in the 
country or at the best, an acceptance of the political situation (Beumers, Hutchings et al. 
2009: 19).  But the tendency to listen more to musical radio stations is seen in many other 
countries, and the popularity of Ekho Moskvy particularly in the big cities (Moscow and St. 
Petersburg) contradicts the conclusion that Russians lack interest in the political life of their 
country. In addition to these radio stations, you can find some Christian radio stations such 
as Russian Christian Radio and New Life Radio FM. The international Christian news 
website ChristianNewsToday, claims that only a few cities in Russia have a local Christian 
radio station due to opposition from the Russian government (Johnson 2010). 
The majority of the commercial radio stations today belong to entertainment media 
holdings. Russian radio stations confront the same challenges as in other parts of the world. 
Most advertising money goes to television channels and internet, and advertising on the 
radio is in decline. In addition, the radio stations meet competition in the digital music 
industry. The state is strongly present in the radio stations using mid-wave and long- wave, 
and on the close-circuit wired radio networks to which millions of elderly people still listen 
(Zassoursky 2009: 37) The radio stations are important for the authorities in building the 
image of a strong independent Russia.  As Ryazanova-Clarke (2009) discusses in her article 
“What's in a foreign word? Negotiating linguistic culture on Russian radio programs about 
language,” the Russian authorities engaged the radio stations in their campaign to focus on 
the Russian language. Several radio stations received funding for their radio programs that 
instructed their listeners how to speak Russian correctly. The radio stations have as such not 
lost their role as a public information channel. 
 
5.4 The printed media 
 
There are more than 400 newspapers in Russia, but several are small and they are 
experiencing difficult times economically.  Newspaper prices have increased and this has led 
to decreased circulation for most newspapers. The typical Russian is said to buy 
approximately one newspaper each week. In a survey in 2001, 58 percent said they read 
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local newspapers, while 36 percent reported that they read national newspapers (Oates 
2006: 31). The circulation of the largest newspapers shows that their readerships cannot 
match the size of the viewing audiences for the major TV channels (Krasnoboka 2010) . As 
opposed to the lack of cost for access to TV channels, the income of the household has 
significance for the ability to consume newspapers. See Table 1 for an overview of the 
newspaper circulation figures. 
Since Putin assumed the prime ministership for the first time in 1999, there has been a 
change in the ownership structures also for the newspapers, particularly the national ones. 
Most of these national newspapers are now in the hands of persons or companies loyal to 
the Kremlin (McFaul and Stoner-Weiss 2008). The most widely read newspapers are 
Komsomolskaya Pravda, Moskovsii Komsomolets, Trud, and Izvestiia (see Table 5). The two 
first-mentioned are tabloid papers, while Rossiskaia Gazeta is the official organ of the 
Russian Federation. The six-page newspaper Trud is also among the most widely read 
newspapers   (Beumers, Hutchings et al. 2009), as is Metro, which is owned by the 
worldwide media house, Metro International. This newspaper is published in the biggest 
cities, including St. Petersburg and Moscow; as the title indicates, it is a newspaper for the 
urban reader.  
 
Table 5 AIR (Average Issue Readership) in 1000 of people and in % of Russian population aged 10 and 
over (2006) 
 Newspaper Thousand 
people 
% 
Total 62, 463 100,00 % 
Komsomolskaya Pravda 4, 135 6.6% 
Moskovsii Komsomolets 3, 147 6.0% 
Trud 1, 171 1.9% 
Izvestiya 1, 008 1.6% 
Rossiyskaya Gazeta 725 1.2% 
Pravda 705 1.1% 
Kommersanty 578 0.9% 
Novaya Gazeta 515 0.8% 
Vedomosti 507 0.8% 
Sovetskaya Rossiya 481 0.8% 
Vremya Novostey 293 0.5% 
Nezavisimaya Gazeta 264 0.4% 
Source: www.comcon-2.com 
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5.5 Internet 
 
According to the World Bank, 31.9% of the population in Russia were using the internet 
in 2008, and according to Internet World Stat, the numbers for 2010 were 41.8 %. Both the 
World Bank and Internet World Stat claim that in 2000, only 2.0% were using the internet, so 
the numbers of citizens with access to internet are heavily increasing (InternetWorldStat 
2010; TheWorldBank 2010) . The majority of the internet users live in Moscow, St. 
Petersburg, Novosibirsk, and several other large cities (Zhitnyuk 2004; Krasnoboka 2010). 
77 percent if those who access internet do this from their homes and 41 percent from their 
workplaces. The primary use for the internet is to check email, then to read news reports and 
blogs (FreedomHouse 2009a). Due to the increased prices for newspapers and expanding 
state control of the media outlets, several online-only papers have made their appearance in 
Russia. Most of those using internet have access through dial-up connection using a land 
phone, which limits the number of users (Strukov 2009: 211).  
We know little of the quality of internet connections and accessibility, but the increase in 
online sources of information has led the government to intensify its monitoring of internet 
media outlets (FreedomHouse 2009a; Krasnoboka 2010; Oates 2010). Although the 
numbers of citizens with access to the internet are steadily increasing, many regions totally 
lack internet access and the majority have access to those online media channels controlled 
by the federal or state authorities. For those with access, the internet soon became the 
proper forum for globalizing the Russian citizens.  The internet is where they, much as the 
citizens in other countries, can access foreign media; they can compare the stories in the 
Russian media with the stories in The Guardian, The New York Times, and foreign TV 
channels streaming on internet. But the internet is also used to spread information that hardly 
corresponds to reality. The term kompromat, compromising material, will be thoroughly 
explained under chapter 6.4.2; here I will only mention the fact that several Russian sites in 
particular devoted to kompromat have been opened (Zassoursky 2004) .  
The Russian internet domains are rapidly increasing, and more than 500,000 such 
domains are Russian, and .ru is now the second-fastest growing domain on the net, just 
beaten by China‟s .cn. The Russian cyberspace is called Runet, referring to all Russian-
language sites together with those hosted in the Russian Federation. Runet has its origin 
from the last part of the 1980‟s, when the World Wide Web (www) made it possible to use the 
Cyrillic language on the net; subsequently, the number of Russian-written websites increased 
dramatically. Internet connectivity soon spread from Moscow and St-Petersburg to the 
regions. The internet in Russia rapidly developed simultaneously with perestroika and the 
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authorities‟ suspension of censorship. Therefore, in the beginning, also in Russia internet 
became a tool for free speech, the free flow of content, and ensuring the anonymity of those 
using the internet, and was in general an area where the users were free from the 
intervention of the authorities. In these early years, the internet became “an extension of the 
samizdat culture and the dissident movement”   (Strukov 2009: 210). The samizdat culture 
will be discussed below, in chapter 6.2.1. 
With the improvement of technologies it became easy to monitor also those using the 
internet as an arena for free speech.  The internet became a mass medium as other mass 
media, and the authorities in Russia saw reasons to curb the possibilities for free expression 
on the internet. Today there are several regulations for the internet in Russia, and these 
regulations permit the government to control the internet, by monitoring the development of 
the industry. Here it is worthwhile mentioning two laws in particular which have been 
designed to monitor and control the internet:  System for Operation-Investigative Activities 
SORM-1 (1995) and SORM-2 (1998). These laws gave FSB (Federal Security Service, heir 
to KGB) the authorization to monitor internet usage and e-mail messages. To enable such 
monitoring “Internet Service Providers must install surveillance devices and high-speed links 
to local FSB departments which would allow the FSB to directly access Internet users‟ 
communication” (Strukov 2009: 214). Those who did not follow these instructions, were 
prevented from continuing their businesses and as the devices needed to do this surveillance 
were quite expensive, small internet service providers were forced to shut down. There have 
been changes in this regulation, it is now required that FSB has a warrant before they can 
look at the electronic traffic of one user, but according to Vlad Strukov‟s article “Russia‟s 
Internet media politics: open space and ideological closure”, this has not yet been 
implemented (2009: 208)  
As has been noted above, Russian infrastructure is not yet developed to the extent that 
all Russian citizens can access the internet, or Runet. But the Russian government sees the 
potential in the internet and has steadily developed technologies to control also this medium. 
FSB and the Kremlin are investigating other measures to ensure their control of the internet, 
e.g., blocking anonymous access from mobile phones or making anonymous access illegal. 
So far, such measurements have not yet been implemented, as the authorities can control 
who and what the citizens access at internet cafes and as will be discussed below, the 
Kremlin uses its power to block those Web pages with content of which they do not approve. 
Still, the internet in Russia contains critical web sites and political parodies of the ruling 
elites of character never allowed on Russian television. But the government is continuously 
monitoring the development of internet, and some of the new legislation of the mass media 
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confirms that the government views the internet in the same way as other traditional media. 
The Kremlin is willing to control and enforce censorship in the online media outlets in the 
same way as it does with television channels and newspapers. The measures of controlling 
the internet will be further investigated in chapter 6.5.4. 
The television channels are mainly owned by the state, the radio stations are with the 
exceptions of Radio Echo Moskvy and a few Christian radio stations, either state-owned or 
commercial and the newspapers with most readers are owned by people close to the Kremlin 
and in the regions by the regional powers.  The internet is increasingly monitored by the 
government. With these structures in mind, an analysis of the media system in accordance 
with Hallin and Mancini‟s main variables will be undertaken.
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6 The Russian Media System 
6.1 Introduction 
 
After discussing the ownership structures and how people access the different media 
outlets, I will look at the Russian media system, its political role and how it corresponds to 
globalization. This chapter offers an analysis of the media system in accordance with the 
analysis prepared by Hallin and Mancini, in order to try to answer the question why the 
Russian media are as they are. The first dimension I will present is the development of media 
in Russia. 
 
6.2 The development of media historically 
 
“In twentieth-century Russia, theory was very important, binding, blinding and extremely 
misleading. It laid the foundation for the Soviet state. Then, in the beginning of the nineties, it 
became the weapon of that state‟s demise, leading again to great debacles and, quite 
possibly, to a lot of unnecessary suffering. The power of theory in Russia declined in the 
nineties as a result of the great demise of the printed press and the rise of television with its 
image-based capacity for emotional involvement” (Zassoursky 2004: x). 
The words of Zassoursky in his Media and Power in Post-Soviet Russia (2004), serve as 
a brief summary of what happened with the Russian media in the twentieth century. It shows 
how theory had a central role also for the development of the mass media.  Such historical 
development of the mass press is one of the variables in Hallin and Mancini‟s media 
analysis. In many ways, this is particularly interesting in Russia. As the most important 
successor state of the Soviet Union, the heritage from the communist era is obvious in 
Russia. The mass media under the Soviet regime were dependent both on the state and on 
the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). The control of media varied from 
omnipresent and strict censorship under Iosif V. Stalin (1879-1953; General Secretary, 1922-
1953), to the more liberal face under Nikita S. Khrushchev (1894-1971; First Secretary, 
1953-1964), but the responsibility and tasks of the Soviet media were to support the 
Communist Party and its policy, regardless of who occupied the post of General Secretary of 
the CPSU. The state owned both radio and television, but the content in the media was 
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controlled and regulated by the CPSU through a multitude of resolutions and directives 
(Oates 2006; d'Haenens and Sayes 2007).  
The first Russian newspapers were initiated by Tsar Peter the Great (1672-1725; 
reigned as emperor, 1682-1725) in the eighteenth century, and were established as political 
instruments for the tsar and his descendants. The newspapers were highly dependent on the 
authorities, reflected their interests, and did not reflect the public interest (except to the 
extent that it might coincide with the interest of the tsar and his ruling elite). There were 
hardly any political discussions outside the court at all (Simons and Strovsky 2006). But in 
the discussion of the historic development of the Russian media outlets, this thesis will look 
at the development since the Russian revolution in 1917, when Vladimir Ilyich Lenin (1870 – 
1924, chairman of the Council of People‟s Commissars of the Soviet Union 1922 - 1924) 
came to power. 
I have chosen to divide Soviet and Russian history in the period since 1917 into three 
different periods.  The first period will be from 1917 until 1985, when, after a brief period 
during which the Mensheviks were able to publish their newspapers, all mass media were 
controlled by the Communist Party and subject to censorship.  Of course, it is well known 
that there were striking differences at all levels of policy when one compares the Stalin era 
with the Khrushchev era with the Brezhnev era, but it was only with the advent of 
Gorbachev‟s glasnost and the passage of Yeltsin‟s media law that the mass media were 
freed from strict censorship and freedom of speech (including in print) was guaranteed.  At 
that time, there was also provision for the privatisation of media outlets. The years 1985-
1999, the era of Gorbachev and Yeltsin, thus, constitute the second period in this scheme, 
while Putin‟s de-privatization and return to more self-censorship marks the third period 
(Oates 2006; Simons and Strovsky 2006).  
 
6.2.1 1917- 1985: The Communist era 
 
Although this thesis focuses on the media system today, since 2000, a brief account of 
the media situation under the Communist Party is of interest. As Hallin and Mancini (2004) 
argue, the historic development of the media has a continued impact on the media system 
we see today.  
After the revolution in 1917, censorship was abolished by the Provisional Government, 
but as early as 1922, Glavlit (the Main Administration for Safeguarding State Secrets in the 
Press) was established as the central censorship office.  Censorship in the Union of Soviet 
40
Socialist Republics (USSR) under Stalin was thorough and permeated all of society.  Glavlit 
was established to ensure that „military secrets‟ were not distributed, as well as, stated in 
very general terms, preventing „anti-Soviet agitation‟. The superior guidance was ideological 
purity, and the government implemented a pre-publication political censorship, which led to 
self-censorship and the banning of all critical journalism. In the Soviet Union, the state 
monopoly on television and radio was total. The state was nominally the owner of both, but 
the CPSU controlled content and activity (Ganley 1996; Zassoursky 2004) . 
Gosteleradio or „the USSR State committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting‟ had the 
responsibility for radio and television broadcasting. Some of the chairmen at Gosteleradio 
were also members of the government and of the Central Committee of the CPSU. 
Gosteleradio was divided into Central Television, Central Radio and External Radio in 
addition to production and technical services. The organisation operated both on the federal 
and the regional level. In the late 1980s, it consisted of 14 republican divisions and 124 
regional centres (Ganley 1996: 5, 11, 70, 79). Means of communication, including both 
printing and broadcasting facilities, were state property. Television and radio editors had to 
be members of the party, educated, trained and selected by the Party, and in this way the 
Party maintained administrative control over broadcasting.  
In addition, the media were controlled by limited access to information sources. Information 
was seen as a privilege, mainly for the elite and handed out on a need-to-know basis. The 
Soviet Information bureau TASS distributed foreign news bulletins that were “assembled 
daily (...) and distributed on differently colored paper according to the degree of detail and 
the targeted reader” (de Smaele 2006: 52). No news or information programs were broadcast 
live, and “television (...) in essence became something like radio with pictures” (Zassoursky 
2004: 7).  Radio news programs were almost compulsory, and when they started at 6 a.m., in 
hotels, hostels and communal apartments the radio could not be turned off. The mass media 
were entirely controlled by the party, and had the functions of propagandist, agitator, and 
organizer as Lenin once described the party press (Zassoursky 2004: 8).  Mass 
communications and the press were understood as necessary ideological and political 
means to organize the masses (Aumente 1999: 50). In the Soviet Union, each branch of the 
CPSU had its own media outlets, functioning as mouthpieces for the sub-departments of the 
party. The newspaper Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star) was the organ of the Ministry of Defence 
of the USSR and Literaturnaya Gazeta (Literary Newspaper) was the organ of the Board of 
the Writers‟ Union of the USSR. The Central Committee of the Communist Party, the 
Supreme Soviet, and the Soviet of Ministers of the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic 
shared the newspaper Sovetskaya Rossiya (Soviet Russia). This did not matter as for the 
political direction of these newspapers; all publications had to follow the party‟s guidelines 
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about content and ideology. But it was well known that the directives from the party would be 
presented in Pravda first. (Zassoursky 2004; Oates 2006).  
The journalists were expected to allow both opinion and “factual” reporting in their 
coverage, in order to gain the ideals of communism. During the Soviet era, there were 
eventually more than 60,000 journalists. Many of these journalists became impatient with the 
censorship and self-censorship which constrained them, and dissident journalists contributed 
to the development of an underground press, the Samizdat (Aumente 1999). 
Samizdat is the evidence that oppositional views and uncensored media existed also 
before President Gorbachev introduced his glasnost. Under Stalin, censorship also included 
literature and poetry, as well as children‟s literature and all published materials, although 
some periodicals were reviewed more carefully than others. Initially, Samizdat, as an 
underground and hence illegal medium, was a way to publish poetry, and distribute this 
among friends. Samizdat was not one publication, or one newspaper, but a number of 
publications, with several publishers. It was an underground system of publication, lasting 
from the mid-1950s to the mid-1980s. The word Samizdat is an abbreviation of 
samsebiaizda, which means Self-publishing. Soon Samizdat developed to more political 
publications, and Soviet dissidents re-published and distributed their texts with the making of 
carbon copies and redistributed it between their friends (Greene 2009: 57).  
One of the first political Samizdat materials was a typescript of Khrushchev‟s secret speech, 
held in 1956.  In his speech to a closed session of the Twentieth Party Congress, 
Khrushchev criticised Stalin, talking about the terror under Stalin. Liudmila Alekseeva, 
chairman of the Moscow Helsinki Group, sees the Samizdat as a social phenomenon. She 
refers to two essential factors that contributed to the appearance of Samizdat.  First, people 
understood that important information did not reach them, such as the invasion of Hungary in 
1956 or of Czechoslovakia in 1968. In addition, the citizens saw that the authorities were 
lying, and that they had no means to distribute their own information or convey their opinions 
back to the authorities (Greene 2009: 58). The samizdat literature was primarily produced 
and read by dissident members of the intelligentsia, and the circulation of the samizdat 
hardly found their way into the countryside (Johnson 1999: 23). Although not fully developed 
as independent newspapers or magazines, Samizdat became a source for information and 
getting oppositional thoughts as they published versions of events that were in opposition to 
the official version.  To work with these publications was dangerous, as they were under the 
surveillance of the authorities; many dissident journalists were arrested, and more than 400 
dissidents were imprisoned in the 1970s. Only a few years before General Secretary 
Gorbachev‟s glasnost, in the period from 1979 to 1980, 86 dissidents were arrested, of whom 
71 dissidents were convicted. It is worth mentioning the samizdat periodical The Chronicle of 
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Current Events which, from 1968, soon developed to be the most important Soviet 
underground periodical, reporting news that Russians could not get elsewhere, such as the 
arrests of dissidents and religious persecution of Jews and Baptists  (Aumente 1999: 51). 
Samizdat publications were important and independent, but only available for the few, in 
particular for intellectuals. 
The legacy of samizdat literature and dissidents are said to have had important impact 
for the glasnost era under Gorbachev. The importance of these dissidents was even 
underlined when, according to Robert Horvath (2005: 91), the leaders of the coup d‟état in 
1991 arrested as many as 75 democrats, among them well-known samizdat journalists such 
as Sergei Grigoriants and Lev Timofeev. Many of those engaged in the political publications 
of Samizdat continued their engagement in human rights groups, such as the Moscow 
Helsinki group. With its focus on human rights and democratic practices, the samizdat 
network had an impact of designing politics in the early 1990‟s (Horvath 2005). The 
journalism of the Samizdat publications was not “a journalism of information with a measure 
of objective and verifiability and informed opinion”, but rather “a combination of informational 
and mobilization, opinion and recruiting messages on behalf of anti-Communism” (Gross 
1999: 152). As such, the Samizdat journalism did not contribute to journalistic 
professionalism and media as the fourth estate, but rather as an opposition to the 
Communism and an arena for human right activists. Horvath describes why the dissident 
culture did not come to power in Russia in the 1990‟s, and may serve as an explanation for 
the lack of impact dissident journalists had on Russian media outlets: “With their emphasis 
on morality and their consistent renunciation of political struggle, most dissident were 
singularly lacking the unscrupulousness and the thirst for power that marked the successful 
post-Soviet politician. On a purely pragmatic level, the dissidents had little experience in 
working in political structures, and could not compete with the established networks of the 
nomenklatura” (Horvath 2005: 205).  Although little research is done to investigate those 
engaged in the Samizdat publications and networks as The Chronicle of Events, those 
journalists had less impact on development of the Russian media outlets than some of the 
young pioneers of Komsomol who early understood the possibilities of media and media 
market.  
 
6.2.2 1985 – 1991: President Gorbachev and Glasnost 
 
With President Gorbachev, the media in Russia came to play a different role, but were 
still seen as one of the allies of the government. Gorbachev saw the media as his partner, 
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contributing to the reformation of the system without changing it. But glasnost provoked the 
politicization of society; together with a remarkable increase in readership, journalists took 
the opportunity to present their own interpretations of political events.  At this time, the press 
also investigated some of the crimes of the Communist Party, and the party leadership‟s 
control over both the press and television became weaker. The party impeded its own control 
of the media, and with its new democratic direction it became difficult to continue censorship 
by closing down publications or discharging chief editors (Aumente 1999; Zassoursky 2004).  
Zassoursky claims that there were no really independent media outlets in this period, other 
than the Samizdat, but many journalists saw the independent journalist and the independent 
media outlet as the ideal. The Law of the Press and Other Mass Media that was passed in 
1990 started a debate about press freedom in the Soviet Union, with liberals wanting more 
freedom for media outlets and less censorship, and party conservatives fearing that glasnost 
was leading to political chaos and destabilization. Some restrictions were still imposed on the 
media outlets in this period; the military in particular restrained the media from writing about 
economical and structural problems in their ranks, and Gorbachev also tried to prevent the 
media from writing negatively about his role in the invasion of Lithuania.  He also tried to 
suspend the aforementioned law which he had initiated. 
The expression “fourth estate” became one of interest for Russian journalists. The first 
live television program started in October 1987, called Vzglyad, or Viewpoint, which soon 
became the most popular television program in the period. The program developed into a 
very popular political talk show, with the combination of late-night talk and a call-in program. 
“Vzglyad was advocated by ideologists in the CPSU Central Committee, who wanted a 
television show that could compete with Western radio broadcasting to the Soviet Union. In 
an effort to lure audiences who were bored to death with Soviet television, three “young and 
charismatic” people were brought from Radio Moscow‟s external propaganda arm.” (Ganley 
1996: 72). The popularity of the show made Kremlin interested, and Gosteleradio made 
efforts to control the show. In 1989, Vzglyad had invited the dissident physicist Andrei 
Sakharov (1921 – 1989, awarded Nobel Peace Prize 1975), who continuously criticised the 
Kremlin in their war in Afghanistan amongst other. Just shortly before the show went on air, 
an order came from the top management of Central Television (Gosteleradio) to stop the live 
broadcast of the show, and rather air a show previously broadcasted. In addition, the police 
came to ensure that the planned show was not taped at all. “By spring, 1990, the Kremlin‟s 
top propagandists seemed to have managed to curb Vzglyad. At first they simply tried to kill 
or to delay several editions of the popular show. Then they tried to replace the Vzglyad team” 
(Vartanov 1991; Ganley 1996: 72-74). The program serves as an illustration of the period, 
and perhaps also how Gorbachev saw the media. The openness of the period is seen in the 
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fact that the program was allowed, although political and critical, and the desire to keep 
control of the media is seen in the fact that the Kremlin in the end chose to close the show. 
In August 1991, communists opposing glasnost and perestroika staged a coup d‟état 
placing Gorbachev under house arrest and taking over the press, television and radio. But 
the putschists were not able to control the independent media outlets, and the journalists 
who had understood the influence they had; the coup petered out after just three days. The 
Russians who were witnessing the coup from the live broadcasted press conference soon 
understood that this coup d‟état would not be carried through: 
Suddenly came the August 19th coup and television was reduced to [the] emergency 
announcement appealing for Soviet patriotism in ponderous pre-glasnost voices. Dead 
air-time was filled with ballet and opera to mask the absence of news. But there were 
seeds of opposition in the controlled media, and when the emergency committee went 
on live television with a press conference to defend the coup, state television producers 
and camera people deliberately focused on the nervous, trembling hands and runny 
nose of one of the coup leaders. Orders to edit this out in later broadcasts, along with 
the derisive laughter and disrespectful questions of sceptical reporters at the press 
conference, went unheeded. It was said that the televised spectacle influenced other 
officials to distance themselves from the coup (Aumente 1999: 54)  
In the 1990s, the television became an important information source for the Russians. By 
bringing in-depth analysis of the weaknesses of the Communist era, critical reports of the 
Afghanistan – Soviet war, etc., TV channels in Russia had an important function in bringing 
information to the Russians, which again led to protests against the leadership (Oates 2006: 
2). 
 
6.2.3 1991 – 1999: The golden age or the reign of the oligarchs? 
 
In 1993, the state monopoly of broadcasting ended with the establishment of the first 
private TV network, NTV. The license to broadcasting was given to NTV by the Kremlin 
administration according to the decree of President Yeltsin. The owner of NTV was the 
business man Vladimir Gusinsky. Two years later, Boris Berezovsky, another business man 
with close connections to President Yeltin‟s family, established the ORT, with 51% owned by 
the state, and the majority of the rest of the shares belonging to a bank owned by Boris 
Berezovsky, (Kiriya and Degtereva 2010; Remington 2010).  
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The beginning of this period is viewed upon as the golden age for the Russian media. 
The first Chechen war (1994-1995) and the media‟s role in the campaigning against this war 
clearly showed the independence of at least some media outlets. The media were able to 
exert pressure on the government, by showing the brutality of the war for the Russian citizen. 
With the television channels‟ coverage, it became obvious for citizens that Yeltsin had not 
kept his promise to cease the attack. The critique was enormous, and led to the termination 
of the war. As we shall see, this was only temporary, as the next president kept the Russian 
media under tight control when the second Chechen war (1999-2002) started (Zassoursky 
2004).  
Much has been written and said about the Russian tycoons who soon became central in 
Russian economical and political life in the 1990s.  With the privatization of Russian state 
enterprises, i.e., the transfer of ownership of state enterprises to private owners, party 
members from the KGB and the Komsomol used their positions to take over state enterprises 
or create banks using their position to win government contracts and privileges. They 
became extremely wealthy as they took over many of these enterprises, not only with legal 
means (Remington 2010). They soon came to be known as the oligarchs, and two of them 
are especially important in the study of mass media:  Boris Berezovsky and Vladimir 
Gusinsky. The oligarchs came to rescue the media outlets in their economic crisis in 1996, 
and several invested in media outlets and played a role in setting editorial policy (Hoffman 
2002). The oligarchs grasped this opportunity to advance their own interests, both economic 
and political interests. They allowed some kind of pluralism, but this was not based on 
balance and political neutrality, where different political interests had access to media, but 
were dependent of the interests of the owners. Political movements with which the oligarchs 
did not want to be associated, such as the Communist Party or the far right, were barred 
from access to media outlets. The pluralism that existed was dependent on the competition 
and dissension between and among the oligarchs, and when they joined forces, pluralism 
was deeply undermined as it was not institutionalized in the system. This became particularly 
obvious in 1996, when the oligarchs joined their forces to ensure the re-election of President 
Yeltsin. Such pluralism as had existed decreased significantly in the course of the campaign 
promoting Yeltsin (Dunn 2009). President Yeltsin‟s health problems had become more and 
more noticeable even before the presidential elections in 1996, but as the oligarchs saw how 
useful Yeltsin was for them, they gave him tremendous support. The television channels they 
owned, and the newspapers they had in their portfolios, were all available to support Yeltsin‟s 
campaign to be re-elected. Boris Yeltsin‟s health problems were kept out of the media 
outlets, and Yeltsin kept his presidential position; the oligarchs kept their power and wealth. 
But the victory would not last long, at least for those oligarchs with the closest ties to Yeltsin 
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and his family, and in addition had political aspirations (Hoffman 2002; Goldman 2004; 
Remington 2010). 
 
6.2.4 2000 – 2010: Putin and Medvedev 
 
Remington (2010) writes that there are strong parallels between the state power under 
Putin and Dmitri A. Medvedev (b. 1965; President of the Russian Federation since 2008) and 
the state power under the Soviet regime. This can also be seen in the authority‟s view of 
society‟s access to information, and how media outlets are being granted access to 
information. Sarah Oates (2007: 1280) chose to call today‟s media system a neo-Soviet 
model of the media.  
Unlike the institutionalized censorship in the USSR, press freedom and the absence of 
censorship are guaranteed in the Constitution. The 1993 Russian constitution is securing this 
rights in the article 29 (Oates 2006: 24). Putin stated, early in his presidency, that freedom of 
the press was necessary in a democracy (Lipman and McFaul 2001). Soon it became 
evident that this was only political rhetoric. As described by Sakwa (2008: 150); Putin‟s 
presidency was accompanied by persistent fears for media freedom. In his speech to the 
Duma in 2000 Putin stated that the press was to be a tool for the state (Remington 2010). 
The Doctrine of Information Security came into force in September 2000, less than a year 
after Putin came into office, ―”for prohibiting media distortion and the deliberate circulation 
of false information” (Belin 2002: 152). The purpose of the doctrine was to increase state 
power and keep information in military, economic and ecological matters outside public the 
arena. The doctrine maintains that only the state can provide Russians with objective 
information, and that the state media therefore must dominate the information market 
(Lipman and McFaul 2001). The message sent to the mass media through this doctrine is 
quite clear; the doctrine “demanded media that would bend to the will of the authorities in 
order to preserve Russia‟s informational integrity” (Simons and Strovsky 2006: 7). There are 
also other challenges to freedom of the press in the legal system of Russia. Sarah Oates 
describes how the media are regulated by laws passed in the Duma and subject to 
presidential decree as well.  
“[The president] can quite effectively limit freedom of speech with edicts that address 
specific issues. In addition, all 89 subjects of the Russian Federation have the 
constitutional rights to issue statues on media in their jurisdiction[...]” [This may lead to 
conflicts with national law and make it difficult for the regional newspapers, televisions 
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and radio stations to follow both legal boundaries.] “The impossibility of operating within 
the law, particularly in some regions, leaves media outlets extremely vulnerable to 
government pressure because there are so many legal excuses for shutting down even 
the most scrupulous and honest broadcaster or publisher. [Another] problem is the 
selective application of the law. [...]The Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, which 
came into force in 1997, introduced criminal liability for slander [...] in Article 129 of the 
code. In addition, Article 146 stipulates that those who abuse copyright or plagiarize can 
be subject to fines, a jail term or even forced labour. More ominously, Article 151 of the 
1995 Civic Code and Article 43 of the Statue on the Mass Media lay the responsibility for 
the correctness of information with the defendant (i.e. the journalist or the media outlet). 
[...]This leaves Russian journalists vulnerable to deception by their sources, and, more 
frighteningly, civil suits even when they have tried to present a story fairly (Oates 2006: 
24 - 25)  
The positive trends toward more freedom of the press under Gorbachev and Yeltsin was 
clearly altered after Putin came into power. The change of policy seemed to involve steps to 
a media-controlled authoritarian system. Putin started his presidency by taking control of the 
independent media outlets, first gaining ownership of the national TV channels and later also 
of the principal newspapers. The closing of websites, and bloggers and journalists working in 
online media being put under arrest, indicate the authorities‟ increasing interest in the 
internet (McFaul and Stoner-Weiss 2008). Russia is currently ranked as the third most 
dangerous working place for journalists, and the organization Reporters Without Borders put 
Russia at 140th place in their freedom of the press index3 in 2010 (ReportersWithoutBorders 
2010e). In November 2010, while writing this thesis I learned about new and severe attacks 
against journalists (ReportersWithoutBorders 2010d). 
After Putin came to power, the oligarchs encountered severe difficulties. While Yeltsin 
depended on the support from the oligarchs, and they were treated as members of his family, 
Putin perceived them as threats to his power. When their interests came into conflict with 
Putin‟s interests, the new president demonstrated fully his willingness to use his power to 
control also media not owned by the state (Becker 2004; Goldman 2004). One by one, Putin 
eliminated the media empires owned by wealthy businessmen with political aspirations. The 
aforementioned Vladimir Gusinsky and Boris Berezovsky were the first exposed to the new 
media regime of Putin.  
                                               
3
 The Reporters Without Borders index measures the state of press freedom in the world. It reflects 
the degree of freedom that journalists and news organisations enjoy in each country, and the efforts 
made by the authorities to respect and ensure respect for this freedom. 
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Putin introduced his media politics with a new policy stating that the state is the best 
information provider and therefore also the state should partly or completely own the media 
outlets In his book Media and Power in Post-Soviet Russia, Zassoursky describes Putin‟s 
intervention in the media politics in such a manner:  
“Right before the eyes of the public, the pendulum of history was again gathering speed, 
and soon we found ourselves on the threshold of a new transformation of Russia‟s 
symbolic image. The hopes and dreams of the rebellious nineties were somehow 
transformed into the image of Great Russia once again coming together to meet 
challenges and combat enemies at home and abroad. The main difference between the 
new system and the preceding one was the monopolization of control over television, the 
node of the national information space. The pressure by the government, exerted via 
threats to cancel licenses or to begin criminal prosecutions, proved able without 
particular difficulty to bring the media-political system under control” (Zassoursky 2004: 
33). 
Before reviewing what Zassoursky means by pressure on the part of the government 
and the monopolization of control over television, a closer look to the ties between the media 
outlets and the political parties in Russia will prove useful. 
 
6.3 The link between the Russian media and the political parties 
 
Political parallelism is the second variables in Hallin and Mancini‟s framework. Political 
parallelism is the degree and nature of the links between the media and the political parties 
(…) “or the extent to which the media system reflects the major political divisions in society” 
(Hallin and Mancini 2004: 21).  This variable is in many ways going to the core of the 
Russian media system. The ownership structures in the media foster a strongly intertwined 
connection between the media and the government party. As discussed in chapter 4 about 
democracy theory, when major political parties or opposition parties are not granted access 
to the media, the media system as an institution supporting democracy is weakened. 
Information is constricted and the public cannot easily inform itself fully about issues on the 
agenda. Therefore, I will analyse the links between the media and the dominant party in 
Russia today, United Russia, and its access to and influence in the media. I will also look at 
the opposition parties and the media, including the opposition movements.  
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When looking at the history of the media in Russia, what is already written, the mass 
media were deeply intertwined with the Communist Party. All information available was 
controlled by the Party and no criticisms were allowed. During the so-called golden period, 
we saw the first independent media outlets. But soon it became evident that also the owners 
of those independent newspapers and television channels had political agendas, and used 
their media as channels for the realization of their goals. In the late 1990s, each television 
channel supported a party or president candidate, something that was easily understood by 
the audience. In the elections from 1999 till 2008, those television channels which have 
survived are, as we will see, giving more coverage to the governmental president candidates 
and the governmental party than to the oppositional voices.  
Sarah Oates in her book Television, democracy and elections in Russia  argues that the 
“political parties and the media enjoy a close, symbiotic relationship in any political system 
[...] However, evidence suggests that by the Russian presidential elections in 2004 this 
connection had become closer to the Soviet propaganda model than to one resembling the 
interaction among parties, candidates, the media and the electorate in developed 
democracies” (Oates 2006: 66).  
 
6.3.1 The Russian Party system 
 
After the collapse of the Soviet communist regime, new parties were established 
alongside the transformed Communist Party. Before the election in 1993, the Communist 
Party of the Russian Federation was the only party with a party infrastructure and local 
organizations in all regions, held together with a political program. The other new parties had 
to start with building this infrastructure in order to get enough votes to be elected to the 
Duma.  Some of these new parties soon saw how they had easy access to voters across 
Russia through the television channels. 
An interesting aspect of the party structure is the continuing change in the number of 
parties fielding candidates in the elections. 13 parties fielded candidates in the 1993 election, 
in 1995 the electorate could choose among as many as 43, which again dropped to 26 in 
1999 and 23 in the election held in 2003 (Oates 2006). With so many new parties and party 
coalitions, it was a challenge for them to make themselves known to the electorate, not to 
mention to attract enough votes to obtain representation in the Duma. The nationwide 
television channels became an important means to convey, to the electorate, information 
about the parties fielding candidates in the elections.  
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The Central Election Commission of the Russian Federation (CIKRF) enforces the 
federal law on the election of deputies of the state Duma and the presidential elections. All 
political parties are granted equal access to media, and are ensured equal terms and 
conditions for participation in election campaigns, referenda, public and political events 
(CIKRF 2001). Such access to media can be acquired to three different actions. 
i. Paid advertising. Virtually all parties and candidates are legally granted rights to buy 
political advertising in the mass media. The legislation set the spending limit at 2.3 
mill § in the elections held in 1999. 
ii. Free time. Every party with candidates running for election is given free time in the 
mass media. This means that all parties are given the same amount of free access to 
the media, but the law that came into effect in 1999, required that parties getting 2 
percent or less of the votes must refund the costs of the free time. This rule effectively 
prevents small parties from using the free time. 
iii. News coverage. Elections are covered by the media outlets, and as noted earlier, the 
nationwide television channels are particularly important as they reach out to nearby 
all of the electorate (Oates 2006). 
But although the law ensures that all parties get advertising at the same rate at all media 
companies, the ability to pay for political advertising will differ considerably among the 
various parties, as the price with the broadcast media during the 1999 elections was 40,000 
rubles per minute. The free time of which all parties with above 2 per cent of the voters 
behind them could take advantage, had little impact on the election results (Zassoursky 
2004; Oates 2006). In November 2010, Medvedev suggested that it might be appropriate to 
change the laws to ensure that all parties campaigning for election get equal television time, 
but critics asserted that, as long Putin enjoys unchallenged, privileged access to the 
television channels, such measures will not improve the opposition‟s access to television 
coverage (Abdullaev 2010a). 
To establish the degree of political pluralism in Russia a closer look at the election news 
coverage is in order. The following chapter rests on studies done by the European Media 
Institute as presented by Oates (2006), Zassoursky (2004) and White et al (2005).  
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6.3.2 The Broadcast Party 
 
In Television, Democracy and Elections in Russia (2006), Sarah Oates suggests a 
theory to explaining that television is not only essential for having electoral success, but also 
how the Kremlin politicians are using television to retain power when forming a political party. 
Oates mentions three conditions in Russia to support her theory that the party supported by 
the government has been and still is a broadcast party, emphasizing how important the 
television channels for parties and politicians seeking to get elected. The theory suggests 
that the most important broadcast party in Russia, is the one with most seats in the Duma, 
and with the strong affiliation with the president, namely the party United Russia. Let us take 
a closer look at the conditions referred to in this broadcast party theory. 
i. Due to the shifting number and names of parties, the Russian voter is not as 
loyal as her Western counterpart. A survey after the election in 2000 revealed 
that as much as 22 percent of the electorate waited to choose their party until 
a week before the election. With such fluctuating voters, this means that a 
party cannot rely on loyal voters and has to struggle for votes until the Election 
Day. Fluctuating voters is not a specific trait of Russia, and can be seen in 
well established democracies in Western Europe as well as United States, but 
the voters and the parties in Russia are in far more flux than these countries. 
ii. The power of the political parties is also debatable as the executive branch is 
given power to obstruct decisions in the Duma. The president is also relatively 
free of affiliation with any party, making the link between party support and 
power quite tenuous.   
iii. The last factor is the non-presence of independent media in Russia, especially 
among the television channels (Oates 2006: 79) 
The parties cannot confide in loyal citizens giving them the votes they need, and the citizens 
cannot trust that the party to which they gave their vote in the last election will run for election 
in the next. In order to be elected to the Duma, the party ensures that the electorate is, 
through the television channels, familiar with the party‟s politicians and politics. With money 
to run advertising campaigns; and influence to ensure that the party gets the news coverage 
you want at the television channels you prefer, the most important being Channel One, the 
party has the ability to be known in the electorate. The constant change in the political 
landscape in Russia and the societal chaos have has led the politicians to rely more on short 
television campaigns than on any long-term connection between the party and the voters. 
The voters are not given the possibility by the television channels to hold the party and the 
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politicians accountable for their actions after being elected. It is important here to note that 
there are parties in Russia not acting as broadcast party, with a strong party structure with 
branches throughout the country, in particular the Communist Party. But the media-based 
broadcast party prevents the development of such a party structure. Although the broadcast 
party uses the popularity it gains from television campaigning and news coverage, it also has 
to exist in the world outside the television channels.  A party list with members, party 
organizers and people running the campaigns is necessary, but with the close connection 
such a broadcast party has to the government, it can make use of the employees in the 
government for executing such tasks (Oates 2002; Reisinger and Hesli 2003; Oates 2006). 
In addition, the government is supporting the broadcast party, United Russia, also in 
controlling the regional media outlets, especially in front of elections. Many regional 
newspapers are being far more independent than the television channels; the media outlets 
can run independent, critical and investigative reports. But the regional media outlets are 
facing difficulties in providing the voters different views, or access to the opposition‟s views. 
Before the Duma elections in December 2010, many regional newspapers reported receiving 
threatening phone calls or invitations to meet with the FSB, and were prevented from printing 
news of the opposition. In November 2010, the regional issue of Novaya Gazeta in Samara 
was closed on the allegation of using unlicensed software. Although this might be true, as for 
many other media outlets and organisations in Russia, the timing was crucial: “it was 
important for the local officials to disarm the opposition ahead of the Duma elections in 
December”  (Eismont 2008: 121 - 123). In 2006, before the Duma elections in 2007, the 
editor of the Saratov newspaper Saratovskii Reporter, Sergei Mikhailov was “brought to trial 
after the newspaper printed a critique of the governing party, United Russia‟s role in 
undermining the dignity and reputation of Russian journalism. Regional party representatives 
demanded that the journalist pay 500,000 rubles or promise to stop criticising United Russia 
until the end of the year“  (Azhgikhina 2007: 1257) 
To follow Oates‟ theory on the broadcast party, the party Russia‟s Choice was the 
broadcast party running for election in 1993. Russia‟s Choice obtained three times as much 
media coverage as the next party the Party of Russian Unity and Accord (PRUA)4, in the 
1993 election campaign for the Duma (see Table 6).  “As a result, the Russian media have 
helped to subvert the fragile party system in Russia, encouraging the creation of media-
driven parties, i.e. 'broadcast parties'” […] (Oates 2002: 2). This theory of the broadcast party 
explains how the Russian media relate to the party in power. The Russian media score high 
                                               
4
 PRUA ran for election to the DUMA in 1993 and 1995. 
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on the variable political parallelism as the television channels and the party of power is 
strongly connected. The connection between such media outlets as television channels and 
the broadcast party are deeply intertwined, and the broadcast party has easy access to 
election coverage at the television channels. The presence of the broadcast party impedes 
the development of other parties. Together with the lack of independent media outlets the 
other parties do not get nearly the media exposure that this broadcast party does, which has 
almost unlimited access to the most important television channels, as Channel One. The 
presence of different point of views or an opposition is almost non-existing in the television 
channel today. A few independence newspapers are representing other tendencies in the 
society but these are read by few.  
Oates (2006) defines the party Russia‟s Choice as the first broadcast party, which ran 
for the Duma in the elections in 1993. The party ran for election with a political platform that 
had a focus on pro-market forces, which did not appeal to the majority of the voters, and they 
came second, with 7.4 percent less votes than the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia 
(LDPR). A new broadcast party was then founded before the new election in 1995, namely 
the pro-governmental party Our Home is Russia. This party chose to put the focus on the 
nationalistic tendencies in the electorate, and with the rise of this party, the Russian 
government had improved the broadcast party in order to respond better to the electorate. 
The leader was the popular prime minister, Viktor Stepanovich Chernomyrdin (1938 – 2010, 
prime minister 1992 – 1998)5. The party managed to get more than a quarter of all paid 
advertising and editorial coverage. The party did not win the election in 1995 - that was 
accomplished by the Communist Party.  Before the elections in 1999, Our Home is Russia‟s 
leaders had broken with Kremlin, and the Yeltsin administration needed a new party 
organization to consolidate their power. The new broadcast party was named Unity, and the 
goal was to both shape the preferences of the voters, and convince them that this was the 
best party to pursue their interests, and the means to accomplish that goal was the media, or 
more specifically, the television channels.  
 
6.3.3 The media and the party United Russia 
 
The last in line of these broadcast parties is, as mentioned, the party holding the majority 
of the seats in the Duma, United Russia. Before the elections in 2003, the Unity went 
                                               
5
 Victor Chernomyrdin was the founder of Gazprom Energy Company. His political carrier started in 
the CPSU, and he sat in the CPSU‟s central committee as member of the industry department, and 
under General Secretary Gorbachev, Chernomyrdin was the Minister of Gas Industries. Chernomyrdin 
became prime minister under President Yeltsin.  
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together with the party Fatherland, forming the party United Russia. This party did support 
then President Putin in his presidential campaign, although he has never joined the party. 
Henry Hale, the author of the article “Russia‟s Political Parties and their Substitutes” (2010: 
81), writes that Putin held the position of chairman of the party in 2008, but refused to be an 
actually party member. The current president, Dmitri Medvedev is also not a member, 
although supported by the party. The majority of the governors are affiliated with United 
Russia as well.  In the latest elections in 2003 and 2007, United Russia has managed to get 
the majority of the seats in the Duma. But there have been some signals of change in the 
attitudes from the Kremlin toward such broadcast parties. In November 2010, President 
Medvedev said in a video blog, according to The Moscow Times, that “the ruling party should 
not just be an appendix of the executive branch. Instead […] the ruling party should be 
responsible for forming the executive and must have rights and responsibilities before 
voters.” This statement came after some suggested changes in the electoral system.  
“Among the initiatives are tighter regulation of early-vote and absentee ballots; the 
introduction of electronic ballot-scanners at 5 percent of the country's polling stations; equal 
television time for campaigning parties; and allowing parties that collect more than 5 percent 
of the vote, but less than the 7 percent needed for entry as a faction, to send a 
representative to a legislative body” (Abdullaev 2010a).  These changes might result in better 
access to election coverage both for smaller parties and for opposition parties. But, as 
mentioned earlier, according to The Moscow Times, the Russian analyst Grigory Golosov, 
does not view this suggestion as entirely positive, as long as “Putin reigns on the screen 
unchallenged” (Abdullaev 2010a). This assertion on the part of Golosov was perhaps 
underlined when President Medvedev held his state-of-the-nation speech 30 November 
2010, when none of his earlier statements regarding the failures of the election systems were 
repeated. The only statement he gave regarding the election system, was a suggestion “to 
expand the proportional and mixed systems of elections into local councils for small towns 
and municipalities, which are traditionally formed by single-mandate candidates” (Abdullaev 
2010b). Such a change is said to be likely to improve the chances for a party such as United 
Russia to win seats to the Duma from the smaller municipalities.  
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Table 6 Television Exposure in the 1993 Russian Duma campaign: minutes of editorial time and paid 
advertising 
Source: European Institute for the Media (1994, p. 117) (Oates 2006) 
  
 
As mentioned, the first election where the electorate could vote for the party United Russia, 
was in 2003. Putin supported United Russia, and the party garnered 37.6 percent of the 
votes, 25 percent more than the next party, Russia‟s choice (which, as mentioned, had 
broken with Kremlin). In the most recent election for representatives in the Duma, held in 
2007, United Russia won 64.3 percent of the votes (See Table 7). The Communist Party 
came in second at a comfortable distance, with only 11.57 percent of the votes. Here it 
necessary to note that 14 parties contested in the election, 9 fewer than at the election in 
2003. Although this partly can explain how United Russia obtained significantly more votes 
than in the last election, it does not explain why the Communist Party fell so far behind.  
 
Table 7 Election to the Russian Duma 2007  
Party % [of Votes] Seats 
United Russia Bloc 64.30% 315 
The Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) 11.57% 57 
Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) 8.14% 40 
A Just Russia (JR) 7.74% 38 
Source: ElectionGuide (ElectionGuide 2007) 
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The Organization for Safety and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) provided a quite clear 
analysis of the media coverage during the election campaign in 2007, heavily criticizing the 
lack of access to media for all parties. In addition to listing several of the instances of harsh 
treatment to which independent media outlets and journalists writing about the opposition 
were exposed to, the report says: 
The state-funded media failed to offer a balanced and objective coverage of the relevant 
political subjects and parties. Despite their differing statistical methods, both the official 
monitoring service of the Central Election Commission and the NGO monitoring service 
of the Russian Union of Journalists have indicated an overwhelming coverage in 
advantage for the ruling party on federal TV channels (Haraszti 2007: 2). 
 
Going back to Hallin and Mancini, one could argue that political parallelism in Russia is 
high. The broadcast party theory is specific for Russia and explains the tight connection 
between the state-owned television channels and the leading party. Such a connection is 
also evident in the statistics for news coverage before elections. Being the governmental 
party brings huge advantages in news coverage and election coverage, in addition to having 
more money to spend on paid advertising and better infrastructure as they can use the state 
apparatus. An analysis of the presidential elections shows the same tendencies, that the 
candidate already in power is getting most coverage. When looking at the election results 
and the share in news coverage in the election for president in 2000, the numbers are quite 
clear. The then elected president Putin received a majority of the share of news coverage 
and as is known, he won the elections (see Table 8). 
The news coverage in election campaigns is also biased in the newspapers; with the 
exceptions of Sovetskaya Rossiya and Nezavisimaya Gazeta, the newspapers have taken 
an elitist approach with almost no public discussion or dialogue with the audience 
(Zassoursky 2004).   
The television channels and the newspapers pay the most attention to the leading party 
and the president. The news coverage is biased, and it is difficult for other parties and 
candidates to get the same election coverage as the governmental party. The broadcast 
party is the government party, and is strong affiliated with the president. The authorities own 
the television channels, which gives the broadcast party an advance in getting news 
coverage. Together with the ability to run paid advertising, the amount of time in news 
coverage is significantly higher than for the other parties and candidates. 
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Table 8 Television coverage of Candidates and Results of the Elections 2000, percent 
 
Source: Study by the European Media Institute, March 3 – 21, 2000 (Zassoursky 2004) 
 
What is also seen in Russia giving the country a high score on the variable political 
parallelism is how media personnel also are active in political life. In the election campaign in 
1996, Yeltsin brought in the then head of the NTV television channel Igor Malashenko to lead 
his campaign (Brudny 1997). Throughout his presidency Putin never faced a single 
unfriendly question from a Russian reporter. Those who would raise unwelcome questions 
do not have the access; those who have the access are not inquisitive.  Access to press 
briefings is limited, and only for those approved by the Kremlin (Lipman 2005). As seen in 
chapters 5.2.1 and 6.4.2, corruption, bribery and presenting paid political advertisements as 
news stories are common during election campaigns. 
Journalists are instructed to present the President in a positive manner and during the 
second Chechen War, the media outlets were exposed to direct censorship justified by the 
argument that non-official reporting would be considered “anti-state activity” (Sakwa 2008: 
151; Remington 2010). In 2009 The Kremlin wanted to avoid news reports on the country‟s 
economic crisis. Prosecutors warned against “damaging” reports, Prime Minister Putin 
instructed journalists not to write “unpatriotic” stories, and the media were warned not use the 
word “crisis” in their coverage (FreedomHouse 2009b).  
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The Russian media outlets score low on external pluralism, i.e., the media outlets most 
Russians are accessing do not present different views of view or the opposition‟s viewpoint. 
The election news stories on national televisions “are propelled by advocacy of a candidate 
and denigration of the opponents” (Mickiewicz 2006: 3). Mickiewicz asserts that the television 
channels had a form of external diversity, seen as each television channel was supporting its 
own candidate or had its own political agenda. Not all candidates were granted access in all 
television channels, but as the Russians could find different views on different channels, a 
form of external pluralism present. But also this kind of diversity has diminished (Mickiewicz 
2006). Today we see television channels almost fully controlled by the government, giving 
them the most positive coverage and hardly admitting the opposition any air time.  
Each Friday, a member of the Kremlin‟s presidential staff holds a meeting with the head of 
the state-owned nationwide television channels to determine how to cover the news – and 
what the coverage should contain. Vladimir Surkov (b. 1964), the First Deputy of Staff of the 
President, has been running these meetings. This gives the Kremlin a tremendous 
advantage in exerting its influence on the news coverage, and as such ensuring that the 
controlling powers get positive coverage on the issues of interest for the government (Lipman 
2005; Ioffe 2010; RISJ 2010). When the television channels cover whatever problems Russia 
encounter, the coverage always shows that the president and the prime minister are coping 
with the problems. The statement is quite clear, Russia lies safely in the hands of Medvedev 
and Putin (Lipman 2010).  
The Russian media score low on pluralism as both the external and internal pluralism is 
close to non-existing. When regarding political parallelism the Russian media scores high in 
the sense that this is absolutely present as discussed under this chapter. But at the same 
time, it is tempting to assert that political parallelism does not exist as the other parties do not 
have the same media advocates voicing their agenda and political program.  In then 
President Putin‟s state-of-the-nation speech on 29 November 2007, just days before the 
election, he concluded his speech with these words: “this is why I ask you to vote for United 
Russia on 2 December. I count on you and hope for your support” (Haraszti 2007: 3). The 
unlimited access for the governing party to the media outlets, and the restricted possibilities 
the opposition has to publish their opinions inflict also the journalists and how they conduct 
their work. A closer look at the journalistic professionalism is in order. 
 
6.4 Journalistic professionalism 
 
Also the development of journalistic professionalism in Russia has a heritage from the 
Soviet era. Under the Soviet regime, the “good” journalist wrote for the Communist Party in 
59
order to maintain the social order. The values of a good journalist were not to unmask the 
authorities in their wrongdoings but to serve in the interest of the Party, which owned all 
mass media and ensured their ideological commitment to the Party. A journalist during the 
Soviet era had to be a member of the party, in addition to holding a degree preferably in 
journalism, or other university degree in subjects closely related to media (Aumente, Gross et 
al. 1999: 196). The journalistic ideal, or goal, was propaganda and partisanship, a journalist 
was seen as “a public worker and publicist and his or her articles were merely essays: 
analytical, didactic and paternalistic. Freedom against the government (state) could not be 
permitted” (de Smaele 1999: 176).  
The democratization of media outlets in the 1990s called for new journalistic practices in 
political reporting. The increase in number of newspapers and television channel led to 
increased demand for more journalists, many with no formal education. According to the 
Russian journalist Nadezhda Azhgikhina (2007: 1252), “thousands of non-professionals 
rushed into journalism, which immediately lowered the fairly high standards of publications 
and broadcasts; tabloid journalism appeared (and ﬂourished) […]”. Today, there are no 
formal requirements for becoming a journalist in Russia, but most journalists holds a degree 
in journalism or other disciplines (Pasti and Pietiläinen 2008: 118).   
The actual reporting in the media outlets in a democracy should reflect how the 
journalists are capable of giving the citizens compete and trustworthy news (Voltmer 2000). 
In the first period of the post-communist Russia, from 1993 to 1998, many journalists became 
advocates of democratic values and supported freedom of the press as stated in the Russian 
Federation Law on the Mass Media of 27 December 1991. But as seen earlier, the owners 
did not want a free, independent and critical journalist.  As a result of this, Russian journalists 
are strongly connected with the media owner, supporting a party or a presidential candidate, 
and, rather than defending their own positions, they support the media owner‟s interests. In 
other words, the Russian journalists understand the media outlets as political players, not 
political observers. Objectivity is not seen as a goal, and the objective news report is not 
attainable (Zassoursky 2004; Oates 2007).  
 
The normative models of journalistic professionalism are often viewed up against each 
other, the autonomous journalistic professionalism on the one side and the journalists rooted 
in the partisan advocacy traditions on the other. In Russia, one can see journalists 
representing both models, but, as we will see, the working conditions for the journalists do 
not encourage the first. As I will briefly introduce in this chapter, many journalists encounter 
severe difficulties in the course of their work as journalists. First a review of the professional 
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journalistic practices will be presented. The special characteristic of Russian journalism, 
Kompromat will also be presented.  
 
6.4.1 Holding on to Soviet ideals or moving towards “western” journalism? 
 
The media outlets were traditionally seen as organs for advocating the interests of their 
owners, The Communist Party, and the authorities. The old tradition with subjective articles 
and reviews is still existing in Russia, but at the same time you see an increasing 
professionalism in more comprehensive and factual coverage of topics and events (Voltmer 
2000). In the aftermaths of Mikhail Gorbatchev‟s glasnost, new journalists with hardly any 
formal journalistic training entered into the media (Aumente, Gross et al. 1999: 196). How do 
the journalists in Russia respond to three specific dimensions of professionalism -- 
journalistic autonomy, distinct professional norms and public service orientation -- as 
explained by Hallin and Mancini? Do the Russian journalists have journalistic autonomy, i.e., 
is the corps of journalists free from pressure from their owners? This question goes into 
several aspects of the media system in Russia, as we have seen, the main owner of media 
outlets (i.e. those media outlets most people have access to) are the state. The state also 
sets the premises for the journalists and their work, both as media owners and as law 
makers. Both economical and political forces are working to take control over the media 
outlets, to gain economical advantages and political influence (Voltmer 2000).  
Both the heritage of the Soviet era and the years with increasing freedom of the press in 
the 1990s can be seen in the present journalism. Svetlana Pasti (2005) refers to this as the 
two generations of Russian journalists, the old generation that also practised journalism in 
the Soviet era, and the new generation that entered into journalism after 1990. Katrin Voltmer 
(2000) defines this as new and old journalistic practices. In a survey among St. Petersburg 
journalists, Pasti found that both generations may publish unverified information, they trust 
their sources, especially the authorities, and both generations collaborate with the authorities 
on local and national level. But the two styles of journalism differs in how they view the 
audience, where those from the old generation are still combining facts and comments, using 
Soviet style journalism with the journalist as publicist, the new generation is going towards 
the western model, with the separation of facts and comments. But although the two 
generations are conducting journalism in different ways, they both lack objectivity which 
again leads to a lack of pluralism:  
Nevertheless, it is hard to argue for the existence of any real objectivity in their 
journalism because both generations try to convey their personal opinions on the event 
in question, thereby personifying and destroying factual informing. This reveals the 
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continuing dominance of the publicist role, where the journalist is the writer‟s own 
exclusive preserve, not a technical product. The journalistic authorship is an integral part 
of the professional culture of Russian journalism rooted in the classics of Russian 
literature and publitsistika, inherited from the Soviet school of journalistic genres and 
turning all genres into publitsistika genres without rigid distinction within them. 
Meanwhile, contemporary publicist reporting do not necessarily represent a plurality of 
opinions (Pasti 2005: 101-102). 
Journalistic professionalism in Russia is deemed differently from the way it is viewed in 
the western countries. Although one can agree that objectivity is seldom fully accomplished, 
most western journalists would regard it as a goal to which to aspire. The Russian journalists, 
accordingly this survey by Pasti, do not combine objectivity with journalistic professionalism; 
nor do they see autonomy, independence and self-regulation as part of journalistic 
professionalism. Rather than striving to be the fourth estate providing a check on the other 
powers, the Russian media are working in alliance with the other three powers. Involvement 
in central events such as election campaigns is a sign of professionalism, and the journalists 
are working to fulfil their commitments to their owners, rather than to meet the needs of their 
audience. Both generations perceive their role as serving the political elite, and as 
propagandist for the power-holders in elections, while being critical of those in power or 
representing the views of the opposition is not part of their role, as they understand it. Their 
professional decisions are guided by the interests of the owners and sponsors, and self-
censorship. Self-censorship is conducted due to fear for courts, criminals and even 
dismissals (Pasti 2005). Voltmer suggests that the lack of both objectivity and critical, 
investigative reporting are due to the Soviet era heritage, where criticism were symbolic only, 
and objectivity not considered a journalistic virtue (Voltmer 2000).  
The Russian media are perceived as supporting the state more than filling the role as a 
watchdog of the state (Oates 2006). Oates is referring to the Russian media as “a tame 
lapdog of the state” (Oates 2005: 115). This is not only rooted in the development of 
journalistic professionalism from the Soviet era. The tradition of journalism as controlling and 
criticizing the power elite is weak. Also, the critical journalist encounters, at least, difficult 
environment. Here it is impossible to go one without mentioning the well-known story of Anna 
Politkovskaya. She was working for the independent newspaper Novaya Gazeta6 when, after 
a series of threats, she was killed in the elevator of her apartment in October 2006. She had 
                                               
6
 The biweekly newspaper is owned 49% by Mikhail Gorbachev and Duma deputy Alexander Lebedev 
and 51% by the employees. 
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written several critical articles covering the latest war in Chechnya and there was no doubt 
that she was killed due to her work as a journalist (IFJ 2009: 2; Remington 2010: 141). The 
crime has been taken to court several times, the last time in 2009 where those charged for 
the crime were acquitted. Politkovskaya stands as an example of the many journalists 
reported dead due to their work. Several of these killings according to Reporters Sans 
Frontiers (2009) and International Federation of Journalists (2009) have not led to in-depth 
investigation. It is not clear whether the authorities are behind all the murders of journalists, 
but the impunity for these crimes is the responsibility of an authority not willing to pursue 
criminal proceedings (IFJ 2009). And the latest headlines from Russia in November 2010 
show that both well-known Moscow journalists and journalists from the regions still encounter 
difficulties. In November 2010, three journalists were beaten severely, and one of them, Oleg 
Kashin, from the daily newspaper Kommersant7, was undergoing emergency surgery after 
the beatings. Both Kashin and one of the two other journalists, Anatoly Adamchuk, working 
for a local newspaper in the town Zhukovsky nearby Moscow called Zhukovskiye Vesti, were 
writing about the protests against the authorities‟ plans to build new freeways. Kashin had 
been covering the opposition‟s stand on the new freeway from Moscow to St. Petersburg 
planned to go through Khimky forest. Adamchuk had written about the protests against a 
freeway going through Tsagovsky Forest (ReportersWithoutBorders 2010d). And not only do 
they fear violence; but the editor Mikhail Beketov of Khimkinskaya Pravda was recently 
convicted of defamation for having written critically about an official in connection with the 
deforestation of the Khimky forest.  Apparently, the forest was chopped down in order to 
make room to build a new freeway.  Beketov also made allegations about local 
administrations on other issues as well. He was severely beaten in November 2008 in an 
attack meant to kill him. To this day his assailants are still free, while he was convicted of 
defamation (CPJ 2010; Lipman 2010; Vasilyeva 2010).  Luckily for Beketov, his verdict was 
overturned by the court, due to lack of evidence (Parfitt 2010) . Both the violent 
circumstances the critical Russian journalists encounter and the fact that they can be taken 
to court as criminals, show that the journalistic profession in Russia differs rather radically 
from the western journalistic professionalism. It is difficult to have critical journalism and 
represent the views of opposition politicians when the sanctions range from dismissal or 
                                               
7
 Kommersant is a business-oriented newspaper; which originally stems from 1909, but was closed 
during the regime of the Communist Party. Kommersant resumed as daily newspaper in 1990 with the 
banning of censorship. The exile oligarch Berezovsky was an owner in the late 1990‟s, but is now 
owned by Alisher Usmanov, one of the most richest men in Russia accordingly Forbes Magazine 
2010. 
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heavy beating, to being taken to court accused for defamation or libel. The ethics in 
journalism, the ethics the journalists by which are supposedly guided, will be deeply affected 
by the circumstances under which the journalists work. 
 
6.4.2 Kompromat   
 
The Russian word kompromat refers to the use of compromising material in politics in 
Russia. It can be discussed if kompromat is a feature of the Russian journalism or a feature 
in the conducts of politics, but it certainly shows how politicised journalism in Russia is. 
Kompromat, or compromising documents, is a heritage from the Soviet Union. Political 
leaders in the CPSU collected evidences of their subordinates‟ “wrongdoings”. Kompromat 
was used in order to punish, but also to control those who had a shady past (Ledeneva 
2006). Kompromat has been mistaken for freedom of speech, as supposedly compromising 
material can be widely published and the public has ease access to the material. But as 
Ledeneva (2006) asserts, freedom of gossip has been mistaken for freedom of expression. It 
might be reasonable to compare kompromat with slander, which was mentioned in the 
introduction of this thesis as negative campaigning against a political opponent, but 
kompromat embrace even more.  One definition of kompromat is “the publication (or 
blackmail with the threat of publication) of information, documents, evidence and revelation 
that are related to a genre of denunciation (danos), exposure/unmasking (razoblachenie), 
slander (kleveta) and allegations that can destroy or neutralize political opponents or 
business competitors” (Ledeneva 2006: 58 - 59).. When presented in Russian news 
programs, kompromat may have a basis in reality, but is presented in a biased or incomplete 
way in order to damage the image of that individual or organization as much as possible 
(Oates 2006: 116). In the use of kompromat there are no signs of objectivity or critical use of 
sources. The practice of using compromising material, or kompromat, came to a peak during 
the election campaign before the Duma elections in 1999, and the presidential elections in 
2000. Each media outlet had chosen “its” candidate to support, and in the television channels 
it became quite obvious which candidate each outlet supported, and not at least, which it did 
not support. When one news program smeared one official, the next channel brought a 
counterclaim in its news program. President Putin did get overwhelmingly quota of the news 
coverage prior to the election in 2000, and simultaneously the oppositional candidate, 
Gennady Zyuganov from the Communist Party, was the target of kompromat from the state-
run channels (Oates 2006) .  
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In the elections in 2003 and 2004, the method of kompromat was used to a far lesser 
extent. Although this seems positive, it was not necessary caused by an understanding that 
using kompromat was negative, but more a result of the lack of competition to the 
governmental party, United Russia, in 2003 and to President Putin in 2004. 
During September 2010, the then Moscow mayor, Yuri Mikhaylovich Luzhkov (b. 1936, 
Major of Moscow 1992 – 2010), may have been exposed to kompromat. In September state-
owned TV channel NTV ran a documentary where the mayor was criticized for his conduct 
as mayor, especially in the construction industry. The other media outlets were soon to pick 
up the harsh criticism. Luzhkov was forced to resign by President Medvedev after serious 
allegations of fraud and corruption in construction matters. The allegations are probably true, 
as Luzhkov‟s wife has a construction business that obtained many construction assignments 
from the authorities in Moscow. But why was Luzhkov exposed to this now? According to the 
reports, such corruption had been ongoing for many years, so why was President Medvedev 
eager to get rid of him now, one year before the Duma elections and two years before the 
President election 2012? According to reports from some independent media outlets, the 
removal of Mayor Luzhkov came for the same reasons as the removal of oligarchs in the 
beginning of the 2000s -- to get rid of political opponents. Analysts said that Luzhkov, once a 
partner of Vladimir Putin, started his downfall when he criticized the president. And that gave 
President Medvedev good reason to get rid of him (Golts 2010; Lally 2010; Pravin 2010; 
Walker 2010).  
The corruption and the phenomenon zakazhuka discussed in chapter 5.2.1 are for many 
journalists a part of journalistic professionalism. In her research on St. Petersburg journalists, 
Pasti (2005: 106 - 107) found that the journalists found reasons to justify corruption in their 
work: 
“They argue that as everything around them is corrupt and dependent, there is no other 
way to escape poverty. Journalism and journalists are a commodity. Nobody buys an 
unprofessional journalist. Old (pro-state) values have been displaced by new (pro-
market) values. As the saying goes in Russia, journalism remains the second oldest 
profession, next to prostitution. Both generations identify professionalism as technical 
skill, not including ethical norms; the venality of a journalist means an appraisal of his or 
her professionalism on the labour market” 
The conditions under which the journalists work, the journalistic practices and methods 
as corruption, kompromat and black PR, all are working against the development of 
journalistic professionalism that holds objectivity and criticism of the authorities as ideals. In 
addition, the role of the media owner has been and still is tremendously influential in the 
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Russian media system. A Russian journalist needs to consider who the media owner is, 
something that influences his or her daily work:  
“Particularly since Putin‟s first election in 2000, political interests have increasingly 
consolidated behind Putin, reducing the variation of coverage in Russian media outlets. 
[...] Much as in Soviet times, tight control is not needed at every chain in the command. 
Rather, there is a good understanding of the “line” throughout the news organisation. 
Journalists who choose to question this line by writing a story that is not in step with the 
needs of the patron would not long work for the organization. As a result, it is a system of 
disincentives to free journalism rather than censorship or direct orders that produces 
slanted, incomplete reports (Oates 2006: 28). 
 
6.5 The degree and nature of state intervention in the media system 
 
Some observers have asserted that there are media outlets in Russia that, like their 
western counterparts, enjoy freedom of the press. Some critical voices are both seen and 
listened to (Beumers, Hutchings et al. 2009; Gehlbach 2010). As we have seen, the media 
outlets in Russia are numerous, and Putin‟s own statement, that with all these media outlets, 
the Kremlin “could not control them even if we wanted to” (Gehlbach 2010: 78). But as noted 
in the previous chapter, it is evident that Kremlin still tries to control the media outlets, 
especially those with the best scope of reaching the Russian people.  
Before we look at the degree of state intervention in the media system, what purpose 
does the control or the censorship serve for the authorities? Although the Russia we have 
seen since Putin came to power, has curtailed the buds of democracy that looked so 
promising starting with Gorbatchev and continuing under Yeltsin, it is far from the totalitarian 
regime seen under Stalin. But the changes and the chaos that followed under Yeltsin have 
led not only the authorities, but also the citizens of Russia, to look upon democracy, and 
media freedom not entirely in positive ways (Washington 2010). The reign of the oligarchs 
made the citizens sceptical of the so-called free media, as they saw how the media outlets 
were used to promote the owners‟ interests.  
   The censorship we see is not total, as under Stalin. Most scrutiny is put on the three 
national television channels, the main sources for news for the Russians (Gehlbach 2010).  
As mentioned earlier, the Kremlin holds a meeting with the heads of the three national 
television networks once a week to evaluate the news coverage last week, and discuss the 
news coverage for the next week. This is a way of ensuring that the news programs run 
stories in the interests of the authorities. Television plays a certain role in Russia, like many 
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other nations. With 90% of the Russians having access to one of the six main TV channels, 
television reaches all parts of Russia, like no other media outlet. State TV has ideological 
political functions for the state, which has led to tough restrictions on news coverage. Both 
the state and the non-state channels news programs are restricted in how certain news 
should be covered and presented. Limitation of certain news events, the black-listing of so-
called non-grata persons are some of the guidelines to which the TV channels, both the state 
and the non-state owned, must conform. President Putin was the one who implemented 
these restrictions for how to cover important events, and the same system has continued 
also under President Medvedev (Kiriya and Degtereva 2010). Also the state information 
agencies are equipped with catalogues that list themes not to be discussed, banned 
individuals and words not allowed to be mentioned. Chechnya, hostages, and Politkovskaya 
are examples of banned words and themes. This is how Arkady Babshenko, a journalist of 
the independent newspaper Novaya Gazeta describes the media situation under state 
control: 
“The miner‟s strike in Kuzbass last year [2007] had no media coverage. There are no 
reports of the practically daily occurrences of troop carriers being blown up and police 
raids taking place in Chechnya. The fact that Novaya Gazeta‟s office in Samara was 
searched last year and its editor-in-chief has been followed did not merit a mention in the 
media. During the Beslan crisis in 2004, the authorities gave out false information for 
almost two whole days by claiming the number of hostages to be four times lower than 
[it] actually [was]. At the time of the Kursk submarine tragedy in 2000, the authorities 
withheld the truth for nearly three days. Today, we rarely hear a word about any public 
demonstrations, any opposition to the police‟s arbitrary conduct or any criticism of the 
government. [...] television news is always presented in future tense [...] less gets said 
about what has already been built and done” (Babshenko and Olsen 2008: 117). 
In President Putin‟s state of the nation speech in June 2000, he “divided the media into 
state and the anti-state, attacking private owners for turning media into mass misinformation 
outlets and into means of struggle against the state” (Becker 2004: 148). The rhetoric is 
clear, if the media are not with us, they are against us. This was a signal to the independent 
media outlets in the beginning of 2000s for what was to come. 
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6.5.1 The de-privatization of media outlets 
 
President Putin started his presidency by turning back the privatisation process of the 
media outlets. It was important for the Kremlin to gain control of the media outlets, particular 
television channels. 
The first businessman, or oligarch, exposed to President Putin and his men, was the 
aforementioned Vladimir Gusinsky, who was the owner of a media company called Media-
Most. He had the nationwide TV channel NTV under its umbrella. Media-Most also bought 
shares in the liberal media station Ekho Moskvy and established the daily newspaper 
Segodnya (Today) and the weekly magazine Itogi (Results). Professionalism and quality 
were labels put on the journalists from Media-Most. They emphasised values such as 
objectivity and detachment. Financially this media company was independent; Media-Most 
began by establishing its own media outlets, and the state had no shares in the company. 
But it was Gusinsky‟s connections with the Moscow city government that enabled him to start 
the company, and, due to his support for Yeltsin in the election campaign in 1996, he was 
given control over Channel 4, where NTV broadcast its programs.  
NTV started off as the leading channel in the criticism against the Russian military actions in 
Chechnya. In the first war in Chechnya (1994 – 1996), NTV coverage of the war had a great 
influence on public opinion, and the opposition against the war and Yeltsin grew. In order to 
win the election campaign in 1996, a cease-fire was announced.  But, as already mentioned, 
NTV turned around and started to support Yeltsin. The independent journalist of Media-Most 
was no longer as independent as some of its journalists were receiving money to promote 
Yeltsin in the news, and Igor Malashenko, as previously mentioned,  became a member of 
Yeltsin‟s re-election team still holding on to his post as the director general of NTV. The 
initially independent media outlet of Media-Most became a channel for the viewpoints of their 
owner, just as the other media companies of the time. This became even more obvious when 
Gusinsky lost his bid for Svyazinvest, a telecommunications company. Media-most started a 
defamation campaign against the government in general, and Deputy Prime Minister Anatoly 
Chubais (b. 1955) in particular, which led to his removal from office. The criticism of Yeltsin 
increased further when the second war in Chechnya started 1999 (Lipman and McFaul 
2001). 
In 2000, Media-Most and Gusinsky chose not to support Putin in his presidential election 
campaign, but threw their support behind opposition candidates: The former Prime Minister 
Yevgeny Maksimovich Primakov (b. 1929) for the party Fatherland and Luzhkov for the party 
Yabloko. Gusinsky was soon punished for this independence. Several strategies were used 
to harm Gusinsky. For example, the media company was exposed to selective application of 
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tax laws, and its offices were invaded by heavily armed tax police. Gusinsky himself received 
threats, and was accused of various crimes. Eventually he was arrested and later put under 
house arrest. In June 2002, he submitted to a secret deal, selling his share of Media Most to 
the state-owned Gazprom, in return for his freedom – and § 50 million (Latynina 2003). After 
a long struggle, Gazprom, with the help of the secret service, replaced the management of 
NTV, which resulted in several of its journalists leaving to go to other channels. Gusinsky fled 
the country (Lipman and McFaul 2001; Belin 2002; Becker 2004; Zassoursky 2004). 
According to Edward Lucas, International Editor of The Economist, Gusinsky is living in Israel 
today, and runs a satellite TV channel called RTVi (Lucas 2008: 27). 
 
6.5.2 Impediments on the media in the aftermaths of war on terror 
 
During the regime of Putin and Medvedev, independent media outlets have been taken 
over by owners friendly to the state and elections are being manipulated when oppositional 
candidates are prevented from obtaining access to the media (Sakwa 2008: 176; Remington 
2010: 18, 141 - 143). 
The war on terror gave the authorities additional possibilities to control the information being 
broadcast to the public and more directly in how the media outlets should present the news 
to the Russians. 
In the aftermath of the Chechen wars, Russia has experienced several terrorist attacks, such 
as the hostage taking in the Dubrovka Theatre in Moscow 2002 and the Beslan Tragedy in 
2004. In both cases, the authorities took direct action to control media coverage.  
During the hostage crisis in the Dubrovka Theatre in Moscow in October 2002, approximately 
40 armed Chechen took 850 hostages, demanding that Russian forces should withdraw from 
Chechnya and end the Chechen war. The hostage-takers were said to be in league with the 
Islamic separatist movement in Chechnya. The crisis came to an end when Russian Special 
Forces pumped chemicals into the ventilation system and raided the theatre. During the 
hostage crisis, the radio station Echo Moskvy published an interview with one of the terrorists 
on its website. The interview was removed from the website after the authorities threatened 
to close the website. At the same time, the television channel Moskovia TV was prevented 
from broadcasting for 15 hours after showing the bodies of the hostages as 129 of them were 
killed during the raid (Simons and Strovsky 2006).  
After the Beslan tragedy, the newspaper Izvestiya ran an edition devoted to the 
hostage situation, questioning official casualty figures. The consequences were severe as 
the editor, Raf Shakirov, was forced to resign after the owner of the newspaper received a 
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phone call from the Kremlin. Shakirov was soon replaced by a loyal editor (Simons and 
Strovsky 2006).  
In April 2010, another act of terror was carried out in Moscow. 39 people were reported killed 
and 70 wounded after, according to the FSB, two suicide bombs exploded at the Lubyanka 
Metro station and the Park Kultury. Chechen terrorists have claimed the responsibility for the 
actions. President Medvedev has declared that the anti-terror laws will be extended. In A 
2010, shortly after the suicide attack, Medvedev proposed a bill said to increase the FSB‟s 
power in dealing with Russian citizens submitting it to the Duma. Critics were afraid that the 
bill would also be used to prevent the media from presenting news not in favour of the state. 
Accompanying the bill was a note asserting that the media were in part to blame for the rise 
of extremist activities (Bratersky 2010). The article quotes from the Duma web site: "Some 
media outlets, both print and electronic, openly help shape negative processes in the spiritual 
sphere; propagate individualism, violence and mistrust of the state's capacity to protect its 
citizens, effectively drawing young people into extremist activities" (Bratersky 2010; Duma 
2010). The organization International Freedom of Expression exchange (IFEX) said that 
“[f]acing domestic and international protest, Russian lawmakers scrapped provisions in the 
original bill that would have explicitly allowed FSB agents to summon journalists for 
questioning over news coverage and to demand that editors censor articles considered to 
assist extremists” (IFEX 2010). 
In 2007, Russian authorities put amendments on the Law on Fighting Extremist 
Activity, which stated that extremism also includes media criticism of officials. Violation of this 
would cause both three years of imprisonment for the journalist and if convicted, their 
publication will be closed down. Journalists may also be accused of criminal libel charges for 
either printing or broadcasting statements unfavorable to public officials (Oates 2010: 125). A 
law stating that trials in terrorism, extremism and treason-related cases will not be presented 
before a jury was passed in the Duma in December 2009. Extremist charges are used 
against government critics, both bloggers and journalists (FreedomHouse 2009b). The war 
on terrorism is used as an argument for more state-control of the media, appealing to the 
journalist‟s “patriotic duty”. Although Russia is not the only country where the authorities have 
appealed to the media to be prudent when reporting about terrorist acts, Putin took the war 
on terrorism as a gift to limit what is reported (Simons and Strovsky 2006). 
 
6.5.3 The situation for the regional media outlets 
 
The regional media outlets face censorship in a different extent, viz., at the local level, 
where they are dependent on the local authorities and their view of the mass media and also 
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the region‟s significance for the central authorities. Some regions experience high levels of 
independence, while others are subject to a great degree of control from the local authorities 
(Marsh and Froese 2004; Pörzgen and Sager 2009). As manifestly shown in the North 
Caucasus region, the mass media suffer from censorship, struggling for independent 
reporting (Dzyadko, Juilliard et al. 2009). In 2008, Magomed Yevloyev, an opponent of the 
government and owner of the independent website Ingushetiya.ru was killed by a policeman. 
The policeman was, according to Reporters without Borders, sentenced to two years of 
“supervised residence”, which enabled him to continue as a policeman 
(ReportersWithoutBorders 2010c). This unpunished murder by a policeman stands as an 
example of the harsh conditions also in the regions. The same is seen in the Krasnodar 
region, the home region for Sochi, host of the next Olympic Winter Games in 2014. As 
Reporters Without Borders (2009) report, there are barely any independent media outlets 
left. A media register is created, and all of the media listed in this register will gain subsidies 
as tax concessions and financial advantages. And “the price to pay is political loyalty” 
(Pörzgen and Sager 2009:10).  
The media outlets owned by the regional, district or city authorities, are tools of their 
respective owners, presenting news according to the preferences of those authorities. This 
accounts for the vast majority of local and regional media outlets. Independent media are 
present in most of the regions in Russia, but they struggle to survive economic, and against 
censorship. Regional television channels are relatively popular in Russia, and they address 
different topics than the national, as the spread of HIV and AIDS or children‟s problems. But 
actions done by the government in 2005 and 2006, giving regional broadcasting frequencies 
to the previous mentioned state-owned VGTRK, created regional broadcasters that may be 
controlled by the authorities (Oates 2010: 120 - 121). When the regional independent media 
outlets are critical, they risk not being invited to news conferences and they can face 
economic difficulties, in addition to violence against both journalists and editors. Such media 
are effectively shut out of the information they need (Pörzgen and Sager 2009). And the fact 
that government subsidies for the regional media are not being granted by the regional 
authorities, but directly from the federal budget, has led to less criticism of the central 
authorities on behalf of the regional media outlets (Sakwa 2008: 154). The Russian journalist 
Nadezhda Azhgikhina (2007: 1258) also claims that some journalists in the regional 
newspapers are controlled through their income, which is divided into “a official salary and an 
unofficial „editor‟s monthly subsidy‟ which the journalists receive as a bonus”, presumably 
when writing in accordance with the owners‟ wishes. Many regional newspapers do have 
more freedom to write independent and critical than their national counterparts, and not to 
mention, the television channels. But this freedom is challenged before and during elections, 
as Maria Eismont described in Index of Censorship: “[An] independent regional publisher, 
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Sergei Bachinin in Kirov [..., for] the newspaper Vyatsky Nablyudatel, one of the few regional 
print outlets that has a relative strong investigative stand, was trying to provide its reader with 
independent in-depth coverage of the Duma elections [in 2007], and, according to Bachinin, 
enjoyed increasing popularity. But two days before Election Day, the entire print run was 
confiscated and barred from distribution” (Eismont 2008: 122 - 123). And Aleksei Venediktov, 
chief editor of Echo Moskvy said to Le Monde in 2007; “As for the regional media and local 
newspapers, they belong to governors or administration, which make them instrument of 
propaganda” (Vitkine 2007). Independent journalists and editors in the regions in Russia also 
encounter the same dangerous environment as their colleagues at national media outlets, 
and as editor Bachinin describes it:  
“The journalists and editor are regularly subject to threats of “unpleasantness” by 
officials and anonymous individuals. Access to information on the actions of the 
authorities and major corporations is made extremely difficult. The courts, subservient 
to the authorities, invariably side with officialdom in lawsuits brought against the 
newspaper. The editors constantly face the threat of tax or “fire prevention” 
inspections, conducted so as to give them as hard a time as possible. Unsanctioned 
and illegal phone tapping by the secret services of all the journalists‟ conversations 
and hacking into our computers are an everyday reality and constantly have to be 
borne in mind ” (Bachinin 2008: 133).  
The editor Arkady Landers of the independent newspaper Mestnaya in Sochi was in April 
2010 injured after being assaulted by intruders in his apartment. The editor and his 
colleagues at Mestnaya assume the attack was a reaction to a critical coverage of the 
allegedly corrupt practices of some local politicians in the newspaper 
(ReportersWithoutBorders 2010b). Such incidents contribute to self-censorship.  
The regional media outlets and their freedom of expression are highly dependent on 
the political leaders. In some regions as Sochi and Chechnya, the media are under great 
influence by the regional authorities. In other regions, such as in Perm, the media outlets are 
enjoying more independence as the politicians have no financial interest in the media. But 
most independent media in the regions have been exposed to threats as soon as they report 
critical of governmental officials (Pörzgen and Sager 2009).  
What we will see in the next chapter, the control from the Kremlin is not only limited to the 
regional and national TV channels, radio stations or the printed press. The scope of the 
authorities also reaches the online media. 
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6.5.4 How the Russian authorities control the digital media 
 
As mentioned earlier, 41.8 % of Russians have access to the internet. The increase in 
access has led to an increase in the authorities‟ interests in the online activities 
(FreedomHouse 2009a; Krasnoboka 2010). The aforementioned theatre hostage crisis in 
October 2002 has been described as a turning point for the authorities, as they received 
numerous messages criticising the official version of the events. One of the web pages 
criticising the authorities was running translations of news coverage from foreign media. This 
development aroused the interest of online media in the Kremlin. The solution for increased 
control of the Internet, was through ownership control, and the authorities repeated their 
actions from the beginning of the 2000s, buying web sites from the oligarchs (Soldatov 
2010). 
 According to the Freedom House report on the Digital Media Situation (2009a), the Kremlin 
followed a more careful line in the control of the internet, and has not followed the advice of  
those who have wanted more complete control.  But it has been suggested that Russia 
should build a nationwide filtering apparatus such as China has done; awaiting the build up 
of such a Firewall, the authorities continue to use other methods to control the internet 
sphere. As Freedom House describes such methods:  
 
“If an opposition or grassroots organization starts its own internet platform, Kremlin-
related groups will launch several that are similar in form, if not in content. These sites 
create confusion among users by adopting similar imagery, slogans, and names. 
Meanwhile, bloggers who report on regional protests or some other sensitive incident are 
swamped by other blogs that give an opposite account, sometimes using sophisticated 
language but also resorting to obscenity to discourage debate.” (FreedomHouse 2009a)  
 
As mentioned, in 2007, President Putin signed several amendments that increased the 
definition of extremism, included media criticism of state officials as extremist activity.  
Journalists, media outlets and printers found guilty of producing and distributing “extremist” 
material, risk penalties, without defining what extremist material is. The first to notice this new 
amendments were bloggers, such as Dmitry Kirilin, who in 2009 was given one-year 
suspended jail sentence after blogging about how the current system of government caused 
degradation, demoralisation and the dying out of the Russian people (Soldatov 2010). 
Several critical bloggers have been arrested. Owners of independent web pages risk 
receiving calls from the authorities, such as security agencies or regional administration 
officers, telling the owners to remove unwanted material, and this will again lead to self-
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censorship (FreedomHouse 2009a). The authorities are also using the web to influence their 
citizens, several propaganda sites have been created and one of the effects of these 
propaganda sites is that they dominate the search results in Russia. According to Reporters 
Without Borders, the internet in Russia like other media may become a tool for political 
control (Morillion and Juilliard 2010). To an increasing degree, non-state websites are being 
blocked, whether for hours at a time or even for days. Prior to the presidential elections in 
2008, the website for the newspaper Kompromat, www.kompromat.ru, was blocked, but 
internet users regained access to the site after the elections. The former chess champion 
and now in opposition to the authorities, Gary Kasparov, has set up two web sites, 
www.kasparov.ru and www.rusolidarnost.ru, but both have been blocked and unblocked 
again. Cyber-attacks against oppositional web pages are not unusual; the independent 
newspaper Novaya Gazeta‟s website was inaccessible for seven days in January 2009 after 
a highly organized cyber-attack.  
The government has also established connections with government supporters, in order 
to answer online criticism. One such group is called “the Brigade” and some of its members 
are paid by the government. Their task is to infiltrate discussion forums and they do not 
hesitate to use insults and threats in their campaign for the government. The economist 
Evgeni Gonthmakher asserted in The Moscow Times in June 2009 that he was heavily 
attacked by such group of paid bloggers after comparing Vladislav Surkov, the First Deputy 
Chief of the Presidential Staff, with Leonid Brezhnev‟s chief ideologist Mikhail Suslov (1902 – 
1982, Second Secretary of CPSU 1966 – 1982):  
“I became the target of a massive attack on the Internet. First, a group of bloggers and 
the web sites of United Russia's Young Guard attacked me, mocking my non-Russian 
surname, but none actually responded to the arguments I posited in my article. A few 
Kremlin-friendly newspapers even published long articles written by prominent political 
analysts, the content of which boiled down to the following: 'Gonthmakher, keep your 
dirty paws off Surkov.'” (Withmore 2009) 
Although the authorities want to control some of the information available on the internet, 
“sometimes the internet can fill the void left by traditional media outlets” 
(ReportersWithoutBorders 2010f:51). Video reports that are exposed to censorship at the 
nationwide television channels are posted at RuTube (the Russian answer to YouTube) and 
bloggers are using their blogs to report corruption or the imprisonment of other bloggers 
(ReportersWithoutBorders 2010f). But so far, the majority of the Russian citizens have no 
access to the internet, which may be one reason why the authorities are paying less attention 
to this new medium. Another theory explaining the lesser focus from the Kremlin on the 
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internet compared to the television channels is the supposed desire on the part of Kremlin to 
let the intelligentsia maintain the internet as their arena for discussions – and the same time 
giving the Kremlin a golden opportunity to monitor their activities.  
 
6.6 A duplex media system 
 
The Russian media system may not fit into the models of Hallin and Mancini, as they 
were applying their analysis to media systems in the western countries. Sarah Oates defines 
the media system as a neo-Soviet media model, and others have implied that the media are 
currently experiencing both the same degree of control and equivalent ownership structures 
seen under Brezhnev. The media system has certainly changed since Putin became 
President in 2000. What we see in Russia today is a duplex media system. The independent 
media outlets, newspapers, radio and online media are allowed critical and investigative 
journalism as long as they have few listeners/readers and do not go too far in their criticism.  
They maintain their freedom of expression to fulfil the needs of the intelligentsia and prevent 
criticism from the western countries. These independent media outlets are operating side by 
side with media outlets far more controlled where the television channels are playing a vital 
role in confirming and maintaining the existing power structures. It is a non-information media 
system withholding events and news.  
In many respect, the control of the media outlets on the part of the government, can be 
compared to the model of control in the late Soviet era. But there are some differences. In 
the communist Soviet Union prior to the accession of Mikhail Gorbachev, no other view other 
than that of the CPSU was allowed. Texts were edited and changed until they were 
unrecognizable, and attempting to publish independent views could not only cause 
imprisonment but also result in psychiatric confinement.  
What the Kremlin does today, is to withhold information about important events from the 
main news sources. The aforementioned killing of Anna Politkovskaya was hardly covered by 
the television channels in Russia, but a tremendous interest from abroad media outlets was 
present. The unrests in the regions of Chechnya, Ingushetia and Dagestan are rarely 
mentioned in the Russian broadcast media. Arkady Babshenko, author of the book One 
Soldier‟s war in Chechnya and a journalist in Novaya Gazeta describes the situation:  
“Watching television, you get the impression that Russia is an advanced state with a 
stable and flourishing economy, a functioning legal system and a democratic leadership 
that is constantly concerned with the wellbeing of its people. But you only need to travel 
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100 kilometres outside the capital to find a complete different country – destitute and 
with a medieval governing system. The people here are not free; they are completely at 
the mercy of the local authorities” (Babshenko and Olsen 2008: 117). 
In order to find structures and mechanisms enabling censorship and control, I have 
analysed the media system in Russia. The authorities maintain their control and prevent the 
citizens from being fully informed about political, economical and social conditions in the 
society. How the government maintains this control despite the globalization, it is necessary 
to view the media and the government in Russia in accordance with globalization.
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 7 Globalization and the Russian media 
7.1 Introduction 
 
When analysing media systems today, globalization and its effect on the media outlets 
and the government must be taken into consideration. Hallin and Mancini (2004) discuss the 
convergence of globalization and modernisation in media systems, and how globalization 
may have affected media systems. Globalization is not mentioned in their theoretical 
framework for analysing media systems.  My analysis of the Russian media will add 
globalization as a variable/dimension. The media system needs to be considered in relation 
to globalization and how it affects the media system. Russia is no longer a closed country 
where the citizens get no other input of news and analysis than those of their government or 
the Russian media outlets. Although the majority of the citizens in Russia have no access to 
internet, a steadily increasing numbers do access the internet, and to web sites all over the 
world. They get to see how other parts of the world live and view events of international and 
national character. It is important to note that, perhaps due to the tremendous changes in the 
Russian society since 1985, the Russians want to define the genuine Russia, to promote and 
preserve Russian values and be able to discuss political matters in an open way. 
Let us take a look at how globalization has also reach the Kremlin. 
 
7.2 What is Globalization and how does it affect the media 
 
Simultaneously with the Russians‟ access to the “outside world”, Russians are able to 
export their ideas, views and analyses. Globalization theory emphasizes that globalization 
does not equal westernization. In Anthony Gidden‟s words; “Globalization is becoming 
increasingly decentred – not under the control of any groups of nations, still less of the large 
corporations. Its effects are felt as much in the western countries as elsewhere” (In Curran 
and Park 2000: 7).  The Americanization of the European media systems after the Second 
World War in order to prevent the revival of fascism and anti-democratic forces, has been 
replaced by globalization, even though, as we will see, the Russian authorities are focusing 
on the influence from USA and other Western countries (Hallin and Mancini 2004; Surkov 
2009). Many scholars have contributed to the definitions and discussions of globalization, 
and the task here is not to account for these discussions. I will try to give a definition of 
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globalization in accordance with the media‟s role, in order to serve the analysis of media 
systems. 
Globalization, according to the World Bank, can be summarized as “the global circulation 
of goods, service, and capital but also of information, ideas and people” (Perrons 2004: 1). 
This means, as Giddens said, that one of many results of globalization is the exchange of 
ideas, from the global world to the nation, and from the nation to the global world. Giddens 
has even argued that the state is over, but Curran and Park (2000) are warning against such 
argument, and assert that the development in countries outside the western hemisphere 
should be more taken into consideration when discussing media globalization. Sheila 
Croucher  (2004: 112) asserts that nations have not disappeared; nation is a cultural and 
political category. The concept nation can be defined as “a political concept serving as a 
symbol of societal identity and solidarity as well as a legitimation of practical policies” 
(Francis 1976: 387). And not only has this national level interacted with the global, but the 
global has also interacted with the local level, what in globalization theory is referred to as 
glocalization. “A complex combination of the global and the national [...] a simultaneous, 
mutually implicative, complementary and interpenetrative glocalization” (Rantanen 2005: 
100). Rantanen interprets glocalization to refer to a situation, for example, when global 
companies nationalize their products, and the national companies globalize their products 
(Rantanen 2005). There are tendencies in Russia today showing that the authorities 
understand how to take advantages of globalization. Global companies, such as Newsweek, 
try to influence the nation, but Russia, with its national media companies (or even state 
founded media outlets) can influence on a global scale. Also the state interferes in 
globalization, when the Russian government takes steps to influence the world, at least those 
parts of the world of interest for the government. These measures are taken to an 
increasingly degree through the media outlets.  
In the matter of ownership structures, globalization is seen in the foreign ownership of 
magazines and also commercial television channels, such as the Swedish media concern 
MTG owning minor TV channels in Russia, and also leading Russian businessmen owning 
foreign media institutions. The most famous of the latter is Alexander Lebedev, the owner of 
the independent newspaper Novaya Gazeta in Russia, as well as the British newspapers 
The Independent and the London Evening Standard. At a speech at the Society of Editors 
Lecture in Glasgow in November 2010 he discussed corruption as a global phenomenon. He 
highlighted the need for supporting investigative journalism in order to uncover global 
corruption, and in addition he talked about how British newspapers had influenced his 
thinking (Burrell 2010). Although Russia is one of the nations facing tremendous corruption, 
and rather than criticising the Kremlin for taking too few steps to prevent the increase of 
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corruption, Lebedev chose to take the global approach to the omnipresent problems of 
corruption. 
The magazine Russian Newsweek can be seen as a result of the global world taking part 
in the Russian society. What happened to Russian Newsweek may serve as an example of 
how the government in Russia continue to control media coverage in a global environment. 
The owner was the German publishing company Alex Springer, who established the 
magazine in 2004. The magazine ran critical news stories that were avoided by other media, 
and the first editor, Paul Klebnikov, was shot in a contract killing a few months after the first 
issue came out. The latest editor Mikhail Fishman was exposed to an internet smear 
campaign or kompromat, showing images of him in compromising situations. According to 
the magazine owner, the reason for shutting down the magazine October 2010 was purely 
financial (RussianNewsweek 2010). But in October 2010, however, American Newsweek 
published an online news article telling another story, how the Russian Newsweek‟s critical 
reports of the Kremlin strategist Vladislav Surkov and other critical stories of the court 
systems were perceived by the Kremlin, preventing the magazine from being sold to 
interested buyers (Matthews and Nemtsova 2010; White and Kolyandr 2010).  
 Jakubowicz and Sükösd (2008) go far in suggesting that the influence of the 
international community, or western organizations, has led the media system in Russia in a 
different direction. After the fall of communism, the international community and 
organizations were faced with criticism in Russia, asserting that the international community 
presented a normative, idealized, non-existing media image of the free and democratic 
media of the western that should be the guidelines for the new media in Russia. The criticism 
said that even in the Western countries such free and objective media did not exist.   
“In Russia, post-communist political and business “clans” used westernization and 
Europeanization discourses against communist and right-wing populist during the 1990s, 
to be replaced by a strong development state and nationalism discourse under President 
Putin whose administration refused a mimetic orientation and implemented authoritarian 
media policies” (Jakubowicz and Sükösd 2008: 19) . 
This theory suggests that the globalization might have made post-communist states, 
including Russia, more nationalistic as well as keeping the media system under 
governmental control. Ideological and normative journalism was rejected. It is far too easy to 
assert that the international community is the reason for why the media again came under 
control of the authorities in Russia. By the late 1990s one saw a “russification” of the citizens. 
At the same time the Putin administration was quite explicit in its orientation toward building 
Russian nationalism and pride by referring to the Great Russia under the tsar and the 
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accomplishments the Soviet Union made (Jakubowicz and Sükösd 2008; Surkov 2009; 
Remington 2010). It is also likely that those in power, many of whom had been in power also 
under the Soviet Union or had started their career in the CPSU, wanted to “cling to any 
elements of the old command system they could still maintain” (Jakubowicz and Sükösd 
2008: 19). 
As already noted in the introductory section in this chapter, globalization includes 
influence both on local and national levels. The government-initiated and government-
financed TV channel Russia Today shows that the government in Russia Today is using 
global opportunities to influence foreign publics through media outlets. This is explained by 
Rantinen (2005: 100) that national companies globalize their products, to make their 
domestic products more global in order to attract both domestic and global markets. The TV 
channel was launched 10 December 2005, and according to their own website Russia 
Today, or RT as it prefers to be called, “is the first Russian 24/7 English-language news 
channel which brings the Russian view on global news” (Sakwa 2008; RussiaToday 2010a). 
As mentioned in chapter 5.2, the TV channel was initiated to contribute to improving Russia‟s 
image abroad. It is quite obvious that the intentions are to provide the world and USA in 
particular, the Kremlin‟s point of view – the Kremlin‟s side of the story. RT‟s objective is to 
attract domestic and global markets. Here is from a report in Colombia Journalism Review by 
Julia Ioffe (2010: 4) :  
“[...] message control, though rare and targeted to highly sensitive issues, is not 
exclusive to coverage of the war. The trial of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the oil tycoon and 
Putin rival, is another example. When a RT reporter took a more balanced approach to 
covering the trial than RT‟s previous dispatches, [the news director] Gachechiladze told 
the reporter that he was “not playing for the team.” “He asked me, „Why are you still 
working for this channel?‟ ” the reporter told me. (RT officials deny that this exchange 
took place.) Another correspondent who pitched a story about the aids epidemic in 
Russia - a taboo topic here - was told it was not a “nice” story and was sent to cover a 
flower show instead. Usually, though, the Kremlin line is enforced the way it is 
everywhere else in Russian television: by the reporters and editors themselves. “There is 
no censorship per se,” says another RT reporter. “But there are a lot of young people at 
the channel, a lot of self-starters who are eager to please the management. You can 
easily guess what the Kremlin wants the world to know, so you change your coverage.” 
It can be argued that many TV channels today have a biased focus, using sources 
supporting the point of view of the authorities as well as of the management of the television 
outlet. Russia Today is under the same regulations as the other state-owned TV channels in 
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Russia, ensuring positive coverage of the president in power.  The control by the Russian 
government to which the media is exposed reaches, thus, beyond the geographical borders 
of the nation (Ioffe 2010; Kiriya and Degtereva 2010; TheIndependent 2010). 
In a global perspective, internet access gives a variety of views and opinions from an 
entire world. Some countries hardly have any access, while in countries such as France, 
Germany, and the USA, approximately 70 percent of inhabitants access the internet. As seen 
in chapter 5.5, the number of those with access to internet differs, but still the majority of 
those who access the internet in Russia are living in the big cities. According to the European 
Journalism Centre, about 54 percent of Russians have never used the internet, and in some 
regions as few as 12 percent have access (Krasnoboka 2010). Despite the increased 
opportunities globalization causes with internet and increased access to foreign channels, 
the majority of Russians are watching the state-owned channels, with Russian produced 
news programs. Together with the fact that the authorities control and shape the media 
system, the influence from abroad is minor. Russians do not view the influence from abroad, 
or especially from the West, in only positive terms. The Russians rather feel the West in 
particular are patronising Russia and after being tried to force westernized democracy onto 
them, Russians want to continue to develop their country to their own Russian democracy. In 
the newspaper Rossiiskiie Vesti in April 2005, journalist Alexei Strogin, was accusing the 
USA of wanting to dismember Russia. Strogin claimed that USA‟s geopolitical aspirations in 
their “march of democratisation” were to dismantle Russia. Although his article seems 
extreme, Strogin was probably highlighting some beliefs or tendencies in the society, that the 
global influence can pose a threat to the development of the Russian way (Strogin 2005). 
The sovereign democracy that the then President Putin, together with the Kremlin strategist 
Vladislav Surkov, developed was perhaps a response to this. As president, Putin associated 
himself with the term democracy, but was quite clear that from his point of view Russia 
needed to find its own form of democracy instead of mining the Western democracy. Surkov 
came up with the concept “Sovereign democracy”. In arguing for his concept Surkov (2009: 
8) writes:  
“Here, in Russia, democracy faces major challenges. It must test upon itself and turn to 
its advantage the might of globalization; overcome shadow institutions that block its 
progress – corruption, criminality, the market in counterfeits and disinformation; 
withstand the reactionary attacks of isolationism and oligarchy. It must create a new 
society, a new economy, a new army, a new faith. It must demonstrate that freedom and 
justice can and ought to be thought and discussed in Russia.” 
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In order to build democracy in Russia, the state must make sovereignty at home; take the 
powers from oligarchs and other “shadow institutions”. Abroad, Russia must claim its 
positions in the philosophical, sociological discourses of the west, strengthening the Russian 
culture. Surkov also warned against how the global influence might lead to further dissolution 
of Russia and was defending its participation in globalization. In addition to a renewal of 
Russia in global society, Surkov was quite clear in his support of the past. 
“While critically analysing the past, while acknowledging its errors and failures, we have 
[the] right to and shall take pride in all the best of what we have inherited from the 
Empire and the Soviet Union[...]” (Surkov 2009: 19) 
Globalization has made the government wanting to protect the nation, Russia, against 
outside influence more than becoming influenced by the global. At the same time, the 
government has taken advantage of the possibilities that lies in the nature of media 
globalization, by using media outlets as channels for expressing their views to other parts of 
the world. 
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 8 Conclusion 
 
Why are the Russian media as they are? The answer is, as seen, complex. The legacy 
from the Soviet era, features of Russian journalism, the authorities, ownership structures, 
legislation and journalistic professionalism - -are parts of the Russian media system of today. 
This leads us to the aforementioned dual media system of Russia – the independent media 
outlets read by the few, enjoying some freedom of speech on the one side, and the television 
channels and newspapers watched and read by a vast majority, following the authorities‟ line 
of censorship on the other. I have argued that the media system in Russia today cannot be 
compared to the Soviet media system seen after Stalin, although similarities can be found. 
Journalists are experiencing a society that hardly protects them from violence and arbitrary 
exercising of laws. The media outlets are trying to maneuver themselves in unsafe 
conditions, pleasing both owners and advertisers, together with federal and regional 
authorities and legislation. 
The average Russian citizen has few abilities to run checks on the authorities, whether 
they are federal or regional. The ability to hold those elected accountable for their actions 
after they are elected is close to non-existent. Democradura was introduced in chapter 4, 
where elections are held, but under such conditions that the government is ensured re-
elections. Surkov suggested that Russia should build democracy its own way, and in order to 
build its sovereign democracy, the party United Russia should rule the country for 15 – 20 
years (Remington 2010: 129). Russia today has many similarities with the democradura; 
elections are held, but under such conditions that United Russia are ensured a majority of 
the seats in the Duma. With control of the election news coverage those in power, the 
government, is ensured continued power.  Instead of a media system ensuring the citizens 
means to control and hold the elected accountable, the Russian media system is designed to 
ensure the government re-election. The television channels are keeping up appearances 
with building an image of a well-functioning state with a government working in the interests 
of the people. The independent media outlets may present investigative and critical 
journalism as a service for the intelligentsia and the western countries, as long as they are 
kept small and with marginal influence not in hindrance for the United Russia and the 
government to stay in power. The media system in Russia today is working more to the 
advantage of the authoritarian government, rather than encouraging democratic tendencies 
and accountability. 
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8.1.1 Future research 
 
Much research has been done in the field of media and their relations to the political 
system in Russia, many of which made the writing of this thesis possible. But in some areas 
there could be research done to improve the understanding of the complex media system in 
this vast country.  
 Both the regional media outlets and the religious media outlets have been 
received little attention. In the regional area, a thorough examination of the 
regional television channels and how their content differs from the federal 
channels would be of interest. In addition, the religious media outlets are rarely 
mentioned in the literature, and need a further study.  
 Also, when searching for those working in the samizdat networks of the 1970s 
and 1980s and what happened to them later, I found that little research has been 
done. What became of those journalists in the late 1990s and 2000s? What 
impact, if any, did they have on journalistic practices and the development of 
independent media? 
 The television channels as the major channel for information in Russia are 
thoroughly examined, among others by Sarah Oates to whose work I have 
referred in this thesis. Less focus is put on the content in the independent media 
– are the journalists focusing on accountability and a focus on the fourth estate or 
are they merely working in opposition to the actual regime? Are they contributing 
to the development of journalistic professional practises as objectivity and 
informing the opinion, ensuring pluralism?  
 
These are questions I encountered during the work which should be further investigated. 
Worth mentioning is another problem I met, as I was trying to gather circulation figures for 
the most popular newspapers. It is difficult to say if this was due to my not understanding 
Russian or a poor developed system for gathering circulations figures. What I did find in my 
search for these figures, was that Russia‟s Guild of Press Publishers was to set up a new 
system to monitor newspaper circulation in 2010, but so far it seems this service is not yet 
operating (Zykova 2009). 
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Appendix 
WikiLeaks influences Russian politics 
WikiLeaks are through their leaks, beginning to influence many parts of the world, and 
are a global phenomenon. WikiLeaks are exposed to attempts to be prevented from the 
continuance of leaking documents, and the USA is investigating the possibilities for starting a 
prosecution against Julian Assange, the leader of WikiLeaks. Some of the documents 
revealed the American embassy‟s views about both Putin and Medvedev, naming them 
Batman and Robin, which is quite telling about how the U.S embassy, and thus perhaps also 
the U.S. State Department, sees the dual leadership in Russia. In addition, Russia was 
portrayed as a corrupt kleoptocracy where politicians and criminals were inseparably linked. 
The initial comments from Russia were quite harsh, with Putin soon denouncing the 
statements as slander. The response from Russia changed gradually in a more positive 
direction and Medvedev even suggested that Assange should receive the Nobel Peace 
Prize. The suggestion was seen as an understanding on the part of the Russian government 
that the leaks are more harmful for the USA‟s interests than for Russia‟s. Far more serious 
than the portrayal of Prime Minister Putin and President Medvedev are the allegations that 
NATO secretly prepared a plan in case Russia invaded the Baltic States, which made Russia 
come forward and require answers from NATO. Vladimir Frolov, the former director of the 
National Laboratory for Foreign Policy, a Moscow-based think tank, now President of LEFF 
GROUP, a government-relations and PR company, suggested in The Moscow Times on 13 
December 2010 that WikiLeaks directly meddled in Russian politics. The evaluation from the 
US embassy may, according to Frolov, lead to a more open competition between Putin and 
Medvedev, as both are running for President in the elections in 2012 (Black, Chrisafis et al. 
2010; Frolov 2010; Harding 2010).  
Globalization has effects on both the media and the politicians in Russia – and the 
government also uses the possibilities that globalization affords to influence the world. 
Intellectuals, with access to the internet and citizens in the big cities as Moscow and St. 
Petersburg have access to other views and opinions than the Kremlin‟s. But the great 
majority of Russia‟s population only access the state-owned television channels, where the 
news coverage is reflecting the aspirations of the politicians, rather than the daily activities 
and realities. 
Because of extreme social divisions, there is no such thing today as a united Russia. The 
country is made up of about ten different social spheres consisting of, among others, the 
destitute, and the poor, people who just get by, the war veterans, the well to-do, the rich and 
the authorities. These parallel universes will never meet. Moscow for example does not 
96
represent Russia. It is a unique state surrounded by the rest of the country, and the same is 
true for all of the larger cities. Is should also be noted that civilised society invariably begins 
in the cities. Unfortunately, it is still in embryo. Television is never referred to as „zombie-box‟ 
in the cities, yet the state‟s politics of information is based on fooling society and reducing it 
to an infantile state, not on fostering a society that is prosperous and well-informed. Outside 
the larger cities, people seem to become increasingly „zombified‟ (Babshenko and Olsen 
2008: 120). 
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